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Musings on Information and Knowledge

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  • Robert J. Aumann

Abstract

An invited contribution to a symposium on “Information and Knowledge in Economics,” to appear in Econ Journal Watch. Topics discussed include the distinction between information and knowledge; awareness; logical omniscience; the cost of calculation; semantic and syntactic models of knowledge, and the equivalence between them; and common knowledge of the model. Finally, some aspects of the symposium contributions of Ken Binmore, Jim Friedman, and Eric Rasmusen are discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert J. Aumann, 2005. "Musings on Information and Knowledge," Discussion Paper Series dp389, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  • Handle: RePEc:huj:dispap:dp389
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Robert Aumann & Adam Brandenburger, 2014. "Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium," World Scientific Book Chapters,in: The Language of Game Theory Putting Epistemics into the Mathematics of Games, chapter 5, pages 113-136 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    2. John C. Harsanyi, 1968. "Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 14(5), pages 320-334, January.
    3. John C. Harsanyi, 1967. "Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players, I-III Part I. The Basic Model," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 14(3), pages 159-182, November.
    4. John C. Harsanyi, 1968. "Games with Incomplete Information Played by `Bayesian' Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 14(7), pages 486-502, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Christian Bach & Jérémie Cabessa, 2012. "Common knowledge and limit knowledge," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 73(3), pages 423-440, September.
    2. Yusufcan Masatlioglu & Daisuke Nakajima & Erkut Y. Ozbay, 2012. "Revealed Attention," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(5), pages 2183-2205, August.
    3. Yusufcan Masatlioglu & Daisuke Nakajima, 2015. "Completing Incomplete Revealed Preference Under Limited Attention," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 66(3), pages 285-299, September.
    4. Moscati Ivan, 2009. "Interactive and common knowledge in the state-space model," CESMEP Working Papers 200903, University of Turin.

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