Constitutional implementation of social choice correspondences
A game form constitutionally implements a social choice correspondence if it implements it in Nash equilibrium and, moreover, the associated effectivity functions coincide. This paper presents necessary and sufficient conditions for a unanimous social choice correspondence to be constitutionally implementable, and sufficient and almost necessary conditions for an arbitrary (but surjective) social choice correspondence to be constitutionally implementable. It is shown that the results apply to interesting classes of scoring and veto rules.
|Date of creation:||Mar 2003|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in International Journal of Game Theory, 2005, vol. 33, pp. 381-396.|
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