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Online Matching Pennies

Author

Listed:
  • Olivier Gossner
  • Penelope Hernandez
  • Abraham Neyman

Abstract

We study a repeated game in which one player, the prophet, acquires more information than another player, the follower, about the play that is going to be played. We characterize the optimal amount of information that can be transmitted online by the prophet to the follower, and provide applications to repeated games played by finite automata, and by players with bounded recall.

Suggested Citation

  • Olivier Gossner & Penelope Hernandez & Abraham Neyman, 2003. "Online Matching Pennies," Discussion Paper Series dp316, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    • Handle: RePEc:huj:dispap:dp316
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    File URL: http://ratio.huji.ac.il/sites/default/files/publications/dp316.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Simone Alfarano & Eva Camacho & Gabriele Tedeschi, 2019. "Alternative approaches for the reformulation of economics," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 14(1), pages 1-6, March.
    2. Gilad Bavly & Abraham Neyman, 2003. "Online Concealed Correlation by Boundedly Rational Players," Discussion Paper Series dp336, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    3. Renault, Jérôme & Scarsini, Marco & Tomala, Tristan, 2008. "Playing off-line games with bounded rationality," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 207-223, September.
    4. Aurora García-Gallego & Penélope Hernández-Rojas & Amalia Rodrigo-González, 2013. "Endogenous vs. Exogenous Transmission of Information: An Experiment," Working Papers 2013/06, Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Spain).
    5. repec:dau:papers:123456789/6127 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Hernández, Penélope & Urbano, Amparo, 2008. "Codification schemes and finite automata," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 395-409, November.
    7. Aurora García-Gallego & Penelope Hernández-Rojas & Amalia Rodrigo-González, 2015. "An experimental online matching pennies game," Working Papers 2015/03, Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Spain).

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