Rationality and the Nash Solution to Non-convex Bargaining Problems
Conditions α and β are two well-known rationality conditions in the theory of rational choice. This paper examines the implication of weaker versions of these two rationality conditions in the context of solutions to non-convex bargaining problems. It is shown that, together with the standard axioms of efficiency, anonymity and scale invariance, they characterize the Nash solution. This result makes a further connection between solutions to non-convex bargaining problems and rationalizability of choice functions in the theory of rational choice.
|Date of creation:||Apr 2010|
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