On the General Existence of Pure Strategy Political Competition Equilibrium in Multi-dimensional Party-Faction Models
In this paper, we consider political competition games of two parties in multi-dimensional policy spaces, where the two parties have two factions, opportunists and militants, that intra-party bargain with each other. In such a game, we adopt the party-unanimity Nash equilibrium (PUNE) [Roemer (1998; 1999; 2001)] as an appropriate solution concept, and examine the general existence problem of this. In particular, we suppose that any faction of each party does not necessarily have dictatorial power. We then provide a general existence theorem for PUNE in this class of games.
|Length:||22, 2 p.|
|Date of creation:||Nov 2008|
|Note:||First: January 2007; This version: October 2008|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 2-1 Naka, Kunitachi City, Tokyo 186|
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