Nonconvex bargaining problems
This paper studies compact and comprehensive bargaining problems for n players and axiomatically characterize the extensions of the three classical bargaining solutions to nonconvex bargaining problems: the Nash solution, the egalitarian solution and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. Our characterizing axioms are various extensions of Nash's original axioms.
|Date of creation:||Jul 2004|
|Date of revision:|
|Note:||March 2004, Bibliography: p. 12-13|
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