Litigation Selection as a Signal under Asymmetric Information: A Two-Type Model with Alternating Bargaining Offers
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References listed on IDEAS
- Paolera, Gerardo Della & Taylor, Alan M., 1999.
"Economic Recovery from the Argentine Great Depression: Institutions, Expectations, and the Change of Macroeconomic Regime,"
The Journal of Economic History,
Cambridge University Press, vol. 59(03), pages 567-599, September.
- Gerardo della Paolera & Alan M. Taylor, 2000. "Economic Recovery from the Argentine Great Depression: Institutions, Expectations, and the Change of Macroeconomic Regime," NBER Working Papers 6767, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Mattesini, Fabrizio & Quintieri, Beniamino, 1997. "Italy and the Great Depression: An Analysis of the Italian Economy, 1929-1936," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 265-294, July.
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More about this item
Keywordsasymmetric information; signaling; litigation; settlement; win rate;
- K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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