Litigation Selection as a Signal under Asymmetric Information: A Two-Type Model with Alternating Bargaining Offers
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Keywordsasymmetric information; signaling; litigation; settlement; win rate;
- K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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