Testing Affiliation in Private-values Models of First-price Auctions Using Grid Distributions
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- Luciano De Castro, 2012. "Correlation of Types in Bayesian Games," Discussion Papers 1556, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Luciano De Castro, 2010. "Affiliation, Equilibrium Existence and Revenue Ranking of Auctions," Discussion Papers 1530, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Luciano I. de Castro, 2009. "Affiliation and Dependence in Economic Models," Discussion Papers 1479, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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Keywordsfirst-price; sealed-bid auctions; affiliation; MTP2;
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-03-28 (All new papers)
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