IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hit/hitcei/2009-11.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Testing Affiliation in Private-values Models of First-price Auctions Using Grid Distributions

Author

Listed:
  • Castro, Luciano I. De
  • Paarsch, Harry J.

Abstract

Within the private-values paradigm, we construct a tractable empirical model of equilibrium behaviour at first-price auctions when bidders' valuations are potentially dependent, but not necessarily affiliated. We develop a test of affiliation and apply our framework to data from low-price, sealed-bid auctions held by the Department of Transportation in the State ofMichigan to procure road-resurfacing services: we do not reject the hypothesis of affiliation in cost signals.

Suggested Citation

  • Castro, Luciano I. De & Paarsch, Harry J., 2009. "Testing Affiliation in Private-values Models of First-price Auctions Using Grid Distributions," CEI Working Paper Series 2009-11, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    • Handle: RePEc:hit:hitcei:2009-11
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/hermes/ir/re/29230/wp2009-11.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Luciano De Castro, 2012. "Correlation of Types in Bayesian Games," Discussion Papers 1556, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    2. Luciano I. de Castro, 2009. "Affiliation and Dependence in Economic Models," Discussion Papers 1479, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    3. Luciano De Castro, 2010. "Affiliation, Equilibrium Existence and Revenue Ranking of Auctions," Discussion Papers 1530, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    first-price; sealed-bid auctions; affiliation; MTP2;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hit:hitcei:2009-11. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Reiko Suzuki (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cehitjp.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.