Truth of Taste: The Depth of Relativism
Three relativistic semantic theories were suggested for the statements of taste: indexicalism, propositional relativism and factual relativism. Comparing and contrasting these possible solutions, I invoke three problems Max Kolbel formulates and focus on the problem of disagreement. I challenge Iris Einheuser's theory and claim that while indexical approach underestimates the problem of disagreement, factual relativism overestimates it. Propositional relativism appears to provide the most sensible explanation of the phenomenon.
|Date of creation:||2015|
|Publication status:||Published in WP BRP Series: Humanities / HUM, July 2015, pages-28|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Myasnitskaya 20, Moscow 101000|
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