Does private information affect the insurance risk? Evidence from the automobile insurance market
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KeywordsAdverse selection; Moral hazard; Propitious selection; Insurance;
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-01-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2010-01-23 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-IAS-2010-01-23 (Insurance Economics)
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