Comparing Permit Allocation Options: The Main Points
In discussions about the policy design of domestic emission trading, e.g., when implementing the Kyoto Protocol, the two permit allocation alternatives auctioning and allocation gratis (grandfathering) are often pitted against each other as representing utopian cost-effectiveness and political realism, respectively. In this note, an attempt is made to extract the main points of a comparison between the two options with respect to efficiency and distribution.
|Date of creation:||20 Apr 2002|
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