Tax Avoidance, Redistribution and Voting
The main question addressed in this paper is how the possibility of investing in tax avoidance affects voting and redistributive outcomes in an economy where the tax rate is determined by a majority vote and taxes go to lump-sum redistribution. The outcome depends on the timing and efficiency of tax avoidance. It is shown that in all cases those who invest in tax avoidance pay proportionally less in taxes than others. Politically two cases can be distinguished. One where the population is divided accordingly to income and the median income earner is decisive, and one where the most affluent form a coalition with those with low income and the decisive voter has lower than median income.
|Date of creation:||27 Nov 1999|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Department of Economics, Stockholm, S-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden|
Phone: +46 8 16 20 00
Fax: +46 8 16 14 25
Web page: http://www.ne.su.se/
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:sunrpe:2000_0001. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sten Nyberg)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.