Tax Evasion: A Real Option Approach
A theoretical model of excise tax evasion is developed in this paper. The dynamics of a change in tax policy is derived, under the assumption that consumers benefit from a lower price when entering a "black market". However, entry also impose a sunk cost, which gives rise to asymmetric effects and persistence effects on both aggregate demand and on tax revenues. An increase in the tax rate instantaneously brings more entrants into the black market, whereas a tax cut has no short-run effects on the fraction of the population that has access to the black market.
|Date of creation:||01 Nov 1999|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Department of Economics, Stockholm, S-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden|
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