IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Corruption and competition for resources


  • Bjorvatn, Kjetil

    () (Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration)

  • Søreide, Tina

    () (Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration)


An increasing share of world FDI is carried out by multinationals from developing countries. These investors may have objectives and constraints that di¤er from their developed country counterparts. In this paper we focus on differences in attitudes to corruption, and how these may shape the competition for the right to extract resources in a developing country context. We show how di¤erences in the investors’ level of technology and differences in the host country government's trade-o¤ between bribes and taxes determine who wins the competition for the resource and the winning price. We …nd that the entry of a corrupt investor may induce the honest investor to offer bribes instead of taxes. Surprisingly, however, our analysis also demonstrates that under some conditions, the entry of a corrupt investor may in fact induce the honest investor to increase its tax payments.

Suggested Citation

  • Bjorvatn, Kjetil & Søreide, Tina, 2012. "Corruption and competition for resources," Discussion Paper Series in Economics 18/2012, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:hhs:nhheco:2012_018

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Toke S. Aidt, 2009. "Corruption, institutions, and economic development," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 25(2), pages 271-291, Summer.
    2. Roberto Burguet & Yeon-Koo Che, 2004. "Competitive Procurement with Corruption," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(1), pages 50-68, Spring.
    3. Asiedu, Elizabeth & Lien, Donald, 2011. "Democracy, foreign direct investment and natural resources," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 99-111, May.
    4. Brunnschweiler, Christa N., 2008. "Cursing the Blessings? Natural Resource Abundance, Institutions, and Economic Growth," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 399-419, March.
    5. Jakob Svensson, 2005. "Eight Questions about Corruption," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(3), pages 19-42, Summer.
    6. Kolstad, Ivar & Søreide, Tina, 2009. "Corruption in natural resource management: Implications for policy makers," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 214-226, December.
    7. Christoph Engel & Sebastian Goerg & Gaoneng Yu, 2012. "Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Punishment Regimes for Bribery," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2012_01, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, revised May 2013.
    8. Robinson, James A. & Torvik, Ragnar & Verdier, Thierry, 2006. "Political foundations of the resource curse," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 447-468, April.
    9. Eoin McGuirk, 2013. "The illusory leader: natural resources, taxation and accountability," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 154(3), pages 285-313, March.
    10. Bjorvatn, Kjetil & Soreide, Tina, 2005. "Corruption and privatization," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 903-914, December.
    11. Milgrom, Paul, 1989. "Auctions and Bidding: A Primer," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 3-22, Summer.
    12. Pomfret, Richard, 2012. "Resource management and transition in Central Asia, Azerbaijan and Mongolia," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 146-156.
    13. Matthias Busse & Steffen Gröning, 2013. "The resource curse revisited: governance and natural resources," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 154(1), pages 1-20, January.
    14. Ivar Kolstad & Arne Wiig, 2009. "What determines Chinese outward FDI?," CMI Working Papers 3, CMI (Chr. Michelsen Institute), Bergen, Norway.
    15. Fibich, Gadi & Gavious, Arieh & Sela, Aner, 2004. "Revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 115(2), pages 309-321, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. repec:bla:kyklos:v:70:y:2017:i:2:p:306-329 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Bürgi Bonanomi, Elisabeth & Elsig, Manfred & Espa, Ilaria, 2015. "The Commodity Sector and Related Governance Challenges from a Sustainable Development Perspective: The Example of Switzerland Current Research Gaps," Papers 865, World Trade Institute.
    3. Pavlova, Natalia & Meleshkina, Anna, 2017. "Anti-Corruption and Protection of Competition," Working Papers 041707, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration.

    More about this item


    Corruption; FDI; auction; natural resources.;

    JEL classification:

    • K20 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - General
    • K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General
    • O10 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:nhheco:2012_018. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dagny Hanne Kristiansen) or (Jens Dietrichson). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.