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The Endogenous Architecture for Two-Sided Matching Markets

Author

Listed:
  • Andersson, Tommy

    (Department of Economics, Lund University)

  • Ehlers, Lars

    (Department of Economics, Lund University)

  • Tierney, Ryan

    (Department of Economics, Lund University)

  • Svensson, Lars-Gunnar

    (Department of Economics, Lund University)

Abstract

We propose an endogenous architecture where a market designer can impose arbitrary restrictions on the price space, the capacity structure, the entitlement structure, and the rationing system (the architectural components). This not only generates a specific matching model, but it also endogenously generates an equilibrium concept, a domain of preference profiles, and a matching mechanism (the architectural structure). For almost any imposed restrictions, the endogenously generated mechanism is non-manipulable on the endogenously generated domain of preference profiles. The proposed endogenous architecture resolves the market design puzzle by demonstrating that seemingly disparate matching models, including many of the classic applications, are part of the same unifying architecture.

Suggested Citation

  • Andersson, Tommy & Ehlers, Lars & Tierney, Ryan & Svensson, Lars-Gunnar, 2026. "The Endogenous Architecture for Two-Sided Matching Markets," Working Papers 2026:7, Lund University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2026_007
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    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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