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The Auctioning of a Failing Firm

Author

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  • Persson, Lars

    () (The Research Institute of Industrial Economics)

Abstract

This paper evaluates the welfare consequences of the failing firm doctrine in the EU and US merger laws. I combine an oligopoly model with an "endogenous valuations" auction model. Thereby, I take into account that, in an oligopoly, a firm's willingness to pay for the assets depends on the identity of the alternative buyer. The main result is that the doctrine leads to cost inefficiencies, due to a "least danger to competition" (LDC) condition, which favors small, and thus inefficient, firms. In particular, the LDC condition implies that small firms can preempt acquisitions that would lead to both higher producer surplus and higher consumer surplus.

Suggested Citation

  • Persson, Lars, 1998. "The Auctioning of a Failing Firm," Working Paper Series 514, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0514
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Persson, Lars, 2004. "Predation and mergers: Is merger law counterproductive?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 239-258, April.
    2. Horn, Henrik & Persson, Lars, 2001. "Endogenous mergers in concentrated markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(8), pages 1213-1244, September.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Competition policy; Failing firm defense; Auction;

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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