IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hhs/ifauwp/2013_026.html

Sanctions for young welfare recipients

Author

Listed:
  • van den Berg, Gerard J.

    (IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy)

  • Uhlendorff, Arne

    (University of Mannheim)

  • Wolff, Joachim

    (IAB Nuremberg)

Abstract

Social welfare systems usually imply specific obligations for benefit recipients. If a recipient does not comply with these obligations, a sanction involving a punitive benefits reduction may be imposed. In this paper we give an overview of the literature on the effects of sanctions in social welfare systems and we present first results on the effects of sanctions for young unemployed welfare recipients based on German administrative data. The German welfare system is particularly strict for young individuals. We distinguish between mild and strong sanctions and we focus on the impact of these sanctions on job finding probabilities. Our results suggest that each type of sanction leads to an increased transition rate to work, and that this effect is higher for strong sanctions. However, strong sanctions for young welfare recipients involve a complete withdrawal of the basic cash transfer payments.

Suggested Citation

  • van den Berg, Gerard J. & Uhlendorff, Arne & Wolff, Joachim, 2013. "Sanctions for young welfare recipients," Working Paper Series 2013:26, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:ifauwp:2013_026
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.ifau.se/en/Research/Publications/Working-papers/2013/Sanctions-for-young-welfare-recipients/
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Pipinis, Dimitris & Taylor, Sarah & Tuffin, Andrew & Ross, Colin & Tse, Max, 2016. "Benefit Sanctions: Detailed Methodology," MPRA Paper 80012, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Lombardi, Stefano, 2019. "Threat effects of monitoring and unemployment insurance sanctions: evidence from two reforms," Working Paper Series 2019:22, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • C41 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Duration Analysis; Optimal Timing Strategies
    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:ifauwp:2013_026. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Ali Ghooloo The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask Ali Ghooloo to update the entry or send us the correct address (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ifagvse.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.