IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hhs/hastef/0409.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

A median voter model of health insurance with ex post moral hazard

Author

Listed:
  • Jacob, Johanna

    (Department of Economics, Uppsala University)

  • Lundin, Douglas

    (Dept. of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics)

Abstract

One of the main features of health insurance is moral hazard, as defined by Pauly (1968); people face incentives for excess utilization of medical care since they do not pay the full marginal cost for provision. To mitigate the moral hazard problem, a coinsurance can be included in the insurance contract. We analyze under what conditions there is a conflict between individuals on what coinsurance rate should be set with public health insurance, and we establish conditions for a median-voter equilibrium. Then we allow the public insurance to be supplemented with private insurance, and we establish conditions under which public provision will lead to larger aggregate spending than private provision does.

Suggested Citation

  • Jacob, Johanna & Lundin, Douglas, 2000. "A median voter model of health insurance with ex post moral hazard," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 409, Stockholm School of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:hhs:hastef:0409
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://swopec.hhs.se/hastef/papers/hastef0409.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    More about this item

    Keywords

    health insurance; moral hazard; public provision; median voter;

    JEL classification:

    • H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:hastef:0409. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Helena Lundin). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/erhhsse.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.