Bank Lending Policy, Credit Scoring and Value at Risk
In this paper we apply a bivariate probit model to investigate the implications of bank lending policy. In the first equation we model the bank´s decision to grant a loan, in the second the probability of default. We confirm that banks provide loans in a way that is not consistent with default risk minimization. The lending policy must thus either be inefficient or be the result of some other type of optimizing behavior than expected profit maximization. Value at Risk, being a value weighted sum of individual risks, provides a more adequate measure of monetary losses on a portfolio of loans than default risk. We derive a Value at Risk measure for the sample portfolio of loans and show how analyzing this can enable financial institutions to evaluate alternative lending policies on the basis of their implied credit risk and loss rate, and make lending rates consistent with the implied Value at Risk.
|Date of creation:||29 Sep 1998|
|Publication status:||Published in Journal of Banking & Finance, 2003, pages 615-633.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: The Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics, P.O. Box 6501, 113 83 Stockholm, Sweden|
Phone: +46-(0)8-736 90 00
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Web page: http://www.hhs.se/
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- Stephen D. Williamson, 1987.
"Costly Monitoring, Loan Contracts, and Equilibrium Credit Rationing,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 102(1), pages 135-145.
- Stephen D. Williamson, 1984. "Costly Monitoring, Loan Contracts and Equilibrium Credit Rationing," Working Papers 572, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Ben S. Bernanke & Mark Gertler, 1995. "Inside the Black Box: The Credit Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(4), pages 27-48, Fall.
- Ben S. Bernanke & Mark Gertler, 1995. "Inside the Black Box: The Credit Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission," NBER Working Papers 5146, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bernanke, Ben & Gertler, Mark, 1995. "Inside the Black Box: The Credit Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission," Working Papers 95-15, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Carling, Kenneth & Jacobson, Tor & Roszbach, Kasper, 2001. "Dormancy risk and expected profits of consumer loans," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 717-739, April.
- Kasper Roszbach, 2004. "Bank Lending Policy, Credit Scoring, and the Survival of Loans," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 86(4), pages 946-958, November.
- Roszbach, Kasper, 1998. "Bank Lending Policy, Credit Scoring and the Survival of Loans," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 261, Stockholm School of Economics.
- Roszbach, Kasper, 2003. "Bank Lending Policy, Credit Scoring and the Survival of Loans," Working Paper Series 154, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden).
- Jaffee, Dwight & Stiglitz, Joseph, 1990. "Credit rationing," Handbook of Monetary Economics,in: B. M. Friedman & F. H. Hahn (ed.), Handbook of Monetary Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 16, pages 837-888 Elsevier.
- Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
- Boyes, William J. & Hoffman, Dennis L. & Low, Stuart A., 1989. "An econometric analysis of the bank credit scoring problem," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 3-14, January. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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