The Regulation of Corporate Acquisitions. A Law and Economics Analysis of European Proposals for Reform
A well-functioning market for corporate control is considered by the EC Commission as an important method for monitoring incumbent management and for improving the allocation of resources within Europe. This article examines the regulation of corporate acquisitions in Europe as well as inherent restrictions on takeovers from a law and economics perspective. We find that the European proposals for reform in the proposed 13th Company Law directive do not live up to their promise of encouraging acquisitions. Indeed, we find that the proposed rules inhibit acquisitions in significant ways, and therefore are more likely to result in reduced monitoring of incumbent management and in inefficiencies in the allocation of productive resources in Europe.
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|Date of creation:||Nov 1994|
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