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Deposit Insurance Coverage, Credibility of Non-insurance, and Banking Crises


  • Angkinand, Apanard

    (Department of Finance, Copenhagen Business School)

  • Wihlborg, Clas

    (Department of Finance, Copenhagen Business School)


The ambiguity in existing empirical work with respect to effects of deposit insurance schemes on banks’ risk-taking can be resolved if it is recognized that absence of deposit insurance is rarely credible and that the credibility of non-insurance can be enhanced by explicit deposit insurance schemes. We show that under reasonable conditions for effects on risk-taking of creditor protection in banking, and for effects on credibility of non-insurance of explicit coverage of deposit insurance schemes, there exists a partial level of coverage that maximizes market discipline and minimizes moral hazard incentives for risk-taking in banking. Using both the occurrence of banking crises and non-performing loans in the banking sector as proxies for excessive risk-taking the results strongly support this hypothesis in industrial and emerging market economies. Policy recommendations on the country level require analyses of institutional factors affecting the credibility of non-insurance. In particular, the implementation of effective distress resolution procedures for banks would allow governments to reduce explicit deposit insurance coverage and, thereby, to strengthen market discipline. JEL Classification: G21; G28; F43 Keywords: Deposit Insurance; Banking Crisis; Insolvency Procedures, Market Discipline

Suggested Citation

  • Angkinand, Apanard & Wihlborg, Clas, 2007. "Deposit Insurance Coverage, Credibility of Non-insurance, and Banking Crises," Working Papers 2005-10, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Finance.
  • Handle: RePEc:hhs:cbsfin:2005_010

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Tomas Björk & Yuri Kabanov & Wolfgang Runggaldier, 1997. "Bond Market Structure in the Presence of Marked Point Processes," Mathematical Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(2), pages 211-239.
    2. Ingersoll, Jonathan E. & Skelton, Jeffrey & Weil, Roman L., 1978. "Duration Forty Years Later," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 13(04), pages 627-650, November.
    3. Tomas Björk & Bent Jesper Christensen, 1999. "Interest Rate Dynamics and Consistent Forward Rate Curves," Mathematical Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(4), pages 323-348.
    4. David Heath & Robert Jarrow & Andrew Morton, 2008. "Bond Pricing And The Term Structure Of Interest Rates: A New Methodology For Contingent Claims Valuation," World Scientific Book Chapters,in: Financial Derivatives Pricing Selected Works of Robert Jarrow, chapter 13, pages 277-305 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    5. Montrucchio, Luigi & Peccati, Lorenzo, 1991. "A note on Shiu--Fisher--Weil immunization theorem," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 125-131, July.
    6. Fisher, Lawrence & Weil, Roman L, 1971. "Coping with the Risk of Interest-Rate Fluctuations: Returns to Bondholders from Naive and Optimal Strategies," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 44(4), pages 408-431, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Angkinand, Apanard P., 2009. "Banking regulation and the output cost of banking crises," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 240-257, April.
    2. Alexandru Monahov, 2015. "The Effects of Prudential Supervision on Bank Resiliency and Profits in a Multi-Agent Setting," GREDEG Working Papers 2015-24, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), University of Nice Sophia Antipolis.
    3. Malgorzata Iwanicz-Drozdowska, 2011. "Deposit Insurance Schemes - Lessons from the Crisis for CESEE Banking Systems," Chapters in SUERF Studies, SUERF - The European Money and Finance Forum.

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    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages


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