Certified or Branded? A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the IMF's Policy Support
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KeywordsIMF; signalling; international; lending; foreign ai;
- F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
- F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
- F35 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Aid
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-03-12 (All new papers)
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