Markets with Consumer Switching Costs and Non-Linear Pricing
In a non-cooperative oligopoly model where firms use simple linear prices, Klemperer (1987) has shown that the existence of consumers’ switching costs may generate monopoly like prices, and thereby create substantial loss in welfare. We show that when allowing firms to use two-part tariffs, social optimal prices are always set and the size and distribution of switching costs only affect the distribution of surplus between fims and consumers.
|Date of creation:||13 Mar 2002|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Institutt for økonomi, Universitetet i Bergen, Postboks 7802, 5020 Bergen, Norway|
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