IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hes/wpaper/0281.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Colonial Governance and Resource Allocation in the British West Indies (1838–1938)

Author

Listed:
  • Luisito Bertinelli

    (University of Luxembourg)

  • Fabio Gatti

    (University of Bern, Bocconi University)

  • Eric Strobl

    (University of Bern)

Abstract

Plantation elites continued to dominate local colonial governments in the British West Indies even after the abolition of slavery in 1834, directing public spending towards maintaining public order and protecting their property. As such they resisted any reforms that threatened their power, while the local non-white population, constituting of over 90\% of the colonies’ inhabitants, faced repression, segregation, and limited support. A pivotal shift occurred following the 1865 Morant Bay Rebellion in Jamaica, which prompted Britain to intervene so that by the 1870s most of the West Indian Assemblies were abolished, and the Colonial Office in London assumed direct control of colonial governance. This paper investigates how this shift from the Old Representative System to Crown Colony rule affected government resource allocation. Using public finance data from 16 British West Indian colonies between 1838 and 1938 we demonstrate that the governance reforms led to a significant reallocation of public expenditure towards welfare spending, as well as infrastructure and agricultural development. Our findings contribute to the economic history of colonial governance by revealing how Britain’s political intervention fostered expenditures not necessarily in the interests of the planter oligarchy, thereby promoting a broader modernization of British West Indian economies.

Suggested Citation

  • Luisito Bertinelli & Fabio Gatti & Eric Strobl, 2025. "Colonial Governance and Resource Allocation in the British West Indies (1838–1938)," Working Papers 0281, European Historical Economics Society (EHES).
  • Handle: RePEc:hes:wpaper:0281
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.ehes.org/wp/EHES_281.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mattozzi, Andrea & Snowberg, Erik, 2018. "The right type of legislator: A theory of taxation and representation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 159(C), pages 54-65.
    2. Daron Acemoglu, 2006. "Modeling Inefficient Institutions," NBER Working Papers 11940, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2000. "Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 115(4), pages 1167-1199.
    4. Daron Acemoglu & Michael Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2008. "Political Economy of Mechanisms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(3), pages 619-641, May.
    5. Curtin, Philip D., 1954. "The British Sugar Duties and West Indian Prosperity," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 14(2), pages 157-164, April.
    6. Lange, Matthew K., 2004. "British Colonial Legacies and Political Development," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 32(6), pages 905-922, June.
    7. North, Douglass C. & Weingast, Barry R., 1989. "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(4), pages 803-832, December.
    8. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, 2001. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1369-1401, December.
    9. Frankema, Ewout, 2011. "Colonial taxation and government spending in British Africa, 1880-1940: Maximizing revenue or minimizing effort?," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 136-149, January.
    10. Absell, Christopher David, 2025. "The Price and Welfare Consequences of the British Sugar Act of 1846," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 85(1), pages 215-249, March.
    11. Humberto Llavador & Robert J. Oxoby, 2005. "Partisan Competition, Growth, and the Franchise," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 120(3), pages 1155-1189.
    12. Meltzer, Allan H & Richard, Scott F, 1981. "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 914-927, October.
    13. Douglas L. Miller, 2023. "An Introductory Guide to Event Study Models," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 37(2), pages 203-230, Spring.
    14. Eltis, David & Engerman, Stanley L., 2000. "The Importance of Slavery and the Slave Trade to Industrializing Britain," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 60(1), pages 123-144, March.
    15. J. R. Ward, 1978. "The Profitability of Sugar Planting in the British West Indies, 1650-1834," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 31(2), pages 197-213, May.
    16. Sun, Liyang & Abraham, Sarah, 2021. "Estimating dynamic treatment effects in event studies with heterogeneous treatment effects," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 225(2), pages 175-199.
    17. Shayo, Moses, 2009. "A Model of Social Identity with an Application to Political Economy: Nation, Class, and Redistribution," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 103(2), pages 147-174, May.
    18. Rönnbäck, Klas, 2018. "On the economic importance of the slave plantation complex to the British economy during the eighteenth century: a value-added approach," Journal of Global History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 13(3), pages 309-327, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Matteo Cervellati & Piergiuseppe Fortunato & Uwe Sunde, 2008. "Hobbes to Rousseau: Inequality, Institutions and Development," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(531), pages 1354-1384, August.
    2. Sunde, Uwe & Fortunato, Piergiuseppe & Cervellati, Matteo, 2011. "Democratization and Civil Liberties: The Role of Violence During the Transition," CEPR Discussion Papers 8315, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Lindgren, Erik & Pettersson-Lidbom, Per & Tyrefors, Björn, 2020. "The Causal Effect of Political Power on the Provision of Public Education: Evidence from a Weighted Voting System," Working Paper Series 1315, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 29 May 2021.
    4. Ghosal, Sayantan & Proto, Eugenio, 2009. "Democracy, collective action and intra-elite conflict," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(9-10), pages 1078-1089, October.
    5. Cervellati Matteo & Fortunato Piergiuseppe & Sunde Uwe, 2012. "Consensual and Conflictual Democratization," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-51, December.
    6. Acemoglu, Daron, 2003. "Why not a political Coase theorem? Social conflict, commitment, and politics," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 620-652, December.
    7. Frederik Toscani, 2013. "Why High Human Capital Makes Good Revolutionaries: The Role of the Middle Classes in Democratisation," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1332, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    8. Skaperdas, Stergios & Testa, Patrick A., 2025. "National identity, public goods, and modern economic development," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 412-432.
    9. Jeremy Horpedahl, 2011. "Political exchange and the voting franchise: universal democracy as an emergent process," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 203-220, September.
    10. Barseghyan, Levon & Guerdjikova, Ani, 2011. "Institutions and growth in limited access societies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(2), pages 528-568, March.
    11. Daron Acemoglu & Suresh Naidu & Pascual Restrepo & James A. Robinson, 2013. "Democracy, Redistribution and Inequality," NBER Working Papers 19746, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Savoia, Antonio & Easaw, Joshy & McKay, Andrew, 2010. "Inequality, Democracy, and Institutions: A Critical Review of Recent Research," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 142-154, February.
    13. Robert MacCulloch & Silvia Pezzini, 2010. "The Roles of Freedom, Growth, and Religion in the Taste for Revolution," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(2), pages 329-358, May.
    14. Andrea Asoni, 2008. "Protection Of Property Rights And Growth As Political Equilibria," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(5), pages 953-987, December.
    15. Mwangi S. Kimenyi, 2006. "The Demand for Power Diffusion: A Case Study of the 2005 Constitutional Referendum Voting in Kenya," Working papers 2006-11, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    16. Dincecco, Mark & Katz, Gabriel, 2012. "State Capacity and Long-Run Performance," MPRA Paper 38299, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, 2011. "Pillars of Prosperity: The Political Economics of Development Clusters," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 9624.
    18. Sukkoo Kim, 2007. "Institutions and U.S. Regional Development: A Study of Massachusetts and Virginia," NBER Working Papers 13431, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    19. Meissner, Christopher M., 2014. "Growth from Globalization? A View from the Very Long Run," Handbook of Economic Growth, in: Philippe Aghion & Steven Durlauf (ed.), Handbook of Economic Growth, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 8, pages 1033-1069, Elsevier.
    20. Mwangi Kimenyi & William Shughart, 2010. "The political economy of constitutional choice: a study of the 2005 Kenyan constitutional referendum," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 1-27, March.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • N00 - Economic History - - General - - - General
    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H5 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies
    • O1 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development
    • N3 - Economic History - - Labor and Consumers, Demography, Education, Health, Welfare, Income, Wealth, Religion, and Philanthropy

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hes:wpaper:0281. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Christian Vedel (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ehessea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.