Persuasion Through the Purse: How Political Contributions Crowd Out Information
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- Prat, Andrea, 2002.
"Campaign Spending with Office-Seeking Politicians, Rational Voters, and Multiple Lobbies,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 162-189, March.
- Prat, A., 1998. "Campaign Spending with Office-Seeking Politicians, Rational Voters and Multiple Lobbies," Discussion Paper 1998-123, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
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Keywordsinterest groups; political influence; lobbying; special interests; political contributions; money;
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