An Examination of Compensation Mechanisms to Solve the NIMBY Problem
NIMBY(Not In My Backyard) problems are ubiquitous. Even though it is evident that society needs noxious facilities such as waste sites, people oppose the siting of those facilities around their neighborhoods. Many compensation mechanisms are suggested by researchers in the literature. However, careful attention has rarely been paid to characterizing the optimal mechanism or to comparing the existing mechanisms under different settings. This paper defines the optimal compensation mechanism for the NIMBY problem and shows that the previous mechanisms suggested in the literature are not optimal. Furthermore, four alternative mechanisms are proposed. The existing and newly proposed mechanisms are compared in terms of efficiency and distributive effect. Finally, seven mechanisms are tested in experiments under two different settings. Their efficiencies and distributive effects are discussed.
|Date of creation:||Dec 1997|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 1155 East 60th Street, Chicago, IL 60637|
Web page: http://harrisschool.uchicago.edu/
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:har:wpaper:9705. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Eleanor Cartelli)The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask Eleanor Cartelli to update the entry or send us the correct email address
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.