A Precept of Managerial Responsibility: Securing Collective Justice in Institutional Reform Litigation
Institutional reform litigation places significant, and, at times, inappropriate constraints on the public manager’s ability to balance individual and collective justice. An exemplary misuse of such litigation was the recent New York child welfare case of Marisol A. v. Giuliani. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized an abstention doctrine allowing federal courts to avoid meddling with a state administrative scheme designed to achieve the aforementioned balance. Using the Marisol case as an illustration, we argue that where a state has established an administrative scheme in which public managers follow a precept of managerial responsibility, it must be given the opportunity to work. Claims should be brought in state court to build an instructive "common law," rather than in federal court to deduce process from individual rights. We show that public administration theory urges the same.
|Date of creation:||Aug 2000|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://harrisschool.uchicago.edu/
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:har:wpaper:0011. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Eleanor Cartelli)The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask Eleanor Cartelli to update the entry or send us the correct address
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.