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Interactions entre stratégies de promotion et fusions


  • Laurent Granier

    () (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)


De nombreuses études analysent les phénomènes de fusion en prenant en compte les variables stratégiques des firmes telles que les prix ou les quantités de vente. Or, peu d'études font le lien entre les stratégies de promotion et les fusions. Pourtant, les dépenses mondiales de promotion se porteront à 525 milliards de dollars en 2013 (Zenithoptimedia, 2012). Ceci nous incite à établir un modèle théorique étudiant l'influence de la promotion sur les incitations à fusionner. A l'instar de Friedman (1983a et 1983b), nous introduisons deux types de promotions, l'une étant prédatrice et l'autre coopérative. Nous trouvons que les incitations à fusionner différent de celles existantes dans les modèles de concurrence en prix (Brito, 2003).

Suggested Citation

  • Laurent Granier, 2013. "Interactions entre stratégies de promotion et fusions," Working Papers halshs-00801288, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00801288
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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Huttin, Christine, 1996. "A critical review of the remuneration systems for pharmacists," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 53-68, April.
    2. Sara Ellison Fisher & Iain Cockburn & Zvi Griliches & Jerry Hausman, 1997. "Characteristics of Demand for Pharmaceutical Products: An Examination of Four Cephalosporins," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(3), pages 426-446, Autumn.
    3. Brekke, Kurt R. & Konigbauer, Ingrid & Straume, Odd Rune, 2007. "Reference pricing of pharmaceuticals," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 613-642, May.
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    7. Mats A. Bergman & Niklas Rudholm, 2003. "The Relative Importance of Actual and Potential Competition: Empirical Evidence From the Pharmaceuticals Market," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(4), pages 455-467, December.
    8. Konigbauer, Ingrid, 2007. "Advertising and generic market entry," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 286-305, March.
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    More about this item


    fusions et acquisitions; promotion coopérative; promotion prédatrice;

    JEL classification:

    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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