Employee ownership as a signal of management quality
The employees' decision to become shareholder of the company they work for can be a consequence of employers' matching contribution in company stock. From a behavioral perspective, employees would regard these contributions as an implicit investment advice made by their employer. This paper adopts another viewpoint. Since employee ownership can be used as an entrenchment mechanism, we suggest that employer's matching policy can be considered as an imperfect signal of management quality. This paper suggests that employee ownership can be used by managers to compensate their management skills to the market. It recommends that employee ownership policy should not be influenced by the managers.
|Date of creation:||2010|
|Date of revision:|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00534025|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00534025. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.