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Strategic Default and Equity Risk Across Countries

Author

Listed:
  • Philip Valta

    (GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC - HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Giovanni Favara

    (UNIL - Université de Lausanne)

  • Enrique Schroth

    (UvA - University of Amsterdam [Amsterdam])

Abstract

We test whether the firm's systematic equity risk reflects the shareholders' incentives to default strategically on the firm's debt. We use a real options model to relate the shareholders' strategic default behavior to frictions in the debt renegotiation procedure. We test the model's predictions with an international cross-section of stocks, exploiting the exogenous cross-country variation of bankruptcy procedures. We find that the equity beta increases as debt is more strictly enforced. Moreover, the equity beta decreases with liquidation costs and shareholders' bargaining power, and the sensitivity of this relation weakens as the country's debt renegotiation procedures become more creditor friendly.

Suggested Citation

  • Philip Valta & Giovanni Favara & Enrique Schroth, 2010. "Strategic Default and Equity Risk Across Countries," Working Papers hal-00515919, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00515919
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal-hec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00515919
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    Cited by:

    1. Drozd, Lukasz A. & Serrano-Padial, Ricardo, 2018. "Financial contracting with enforcement externalities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 153-189.
    2. Feldhütter, Peter & Hotchkiss, Edith & Karakaş, Oğuzhan, 2016. "The value of creditor control in corporate bonds," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(1), pages 1-27.
    3. Antill, Samuel & Grenadier, Steven R., 2019. "Optimal capital structure and bankruptcy choice: Dynamic bargaining versus liquidation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 198-224.
    4. Chu, Yongqiang, 2021. "Debt Renegotiation and Debt Overhang: Evidence from Lender Mergers," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 56(3), pages 995-1021, May.
    5. Nishihara, Michi & Shibata, Takashi, 2016. "Asset sale, debt restructuring, and liquidation," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 73-92.
    6. Erwan Morellec & Boris Nikolov & Norman Schürhoff, 2018. "Agency Conflicts around the World," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 31(11), pages 4232-4287.
    7. Bostandzic, Denefa & Weiß, Gregor N.F., 2018. "Why do some banks contribute more to global systemic risk?," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 35(PA), pages 17-40.
    8. Li, Keming & Lockwood, Jimmy & Miao, Hong, 2017. "Risk-shifting, equity risk, and the distress puzzle," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 275-288.
    9. Linnenluecke, Martina K. & Chen, Xiaoyan & Ling, Xin & Smith, Tom & Zhu, Yushu, 2017. "Research in finance: A review of influential publications and a research agenda," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 188-199.
    10. Christophe J. Godlewski, 2019. "Debt Renegotiation and the Design of Financial Contracts," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 55(2), pages 191-215, June.
    11. Erwan Morellec & Philip Valta & Alexei Zhdanov, 2015. "Financing Investment: The Choice Between Bonds and Bank Loans," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 61(11), pages 2580-2602, November.
    12. Godlewski, Christophe J., 2020. "How legal and institutional environments shape the private debt renegotiation process?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    13. Moraux, Franck & Silaghi, Florina, 2014. "Inside debt renegotiation: Optimal debt reduction, timing, and the number of rounds," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 269-295.
    14. Bhamra, Harjoat S. & Shim, Kyung Hwan, 2017. "Stochastic idiosyncratic cash flow risk and real options: Implications for stock returns," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 400-431.
    15. Christophe J. GODLEWSKI, 2017. "Initial conditions and the private debt renegotiation process," Working Papers of LaRGE Research Center 2017-03, Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie (LaRGE), Université de Strasbourg.
    16. Abad, P. & Ferreras, R. & Robles, M.D., 2020. "Intra-industry transfer effects of credit risk news: Rated versus unrated rivals," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 52(1).
    17. Favara, Giovanni & Morellec, Erwan & Schroth, Enrique & Valta, Philip, 2017. "Debt enforcement, investment, and risk taking across countries," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 123(1), pages 22-41.
    18. Sadok El Ghoul & Omrane Guedhami & Chuck C Y Kwok & Ying Zheng, 2021. "The role of creditor rights on capital structure and product market interactions: International evidence," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 52(1), pages 121-147, February.
    19. Jiang, Jinglu & Liu, Bo & Yang, Jinqiang, 2019. "The impact of debt restructuring on firm investment: Evidence from China," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 325-337.
    20. Kim, Gi H., 2016. "Credit derivatives as a commitment device: Evidence from the cost of corporate debt," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 67-83.
    21. Assaf Eisdorfer & Amit Goyal & Alexei Zhdanov, 2018. "Distress Anomaly and Shareholder Risk: International Evidence," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 47(3), pages 553-581, September.
    22. Christophe J. GODLEWSKI & Bulat SANDITOV, 2020. "Private debt renegotiation and financial institutions' network," Working Papers of LaRGE Research Center 2020-01, Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie (LaRGE), Université de Strasbourg.
    23. Panagiotis Avramidis & Ioannis Asimakopoulos & Dimitris Malliaropulos, 2021. "Disrupted lending relationship and borrower's strategic default: evidence from the tourism industry during the Greek economic crisis," Working Papers 285, Bank of Greece.
    24. Kevin Aretz & Chris Florackis & Alexandros Kostakis, 2018. "Do Stock Returns Really Decrease with Default Risk? New International Evidence," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(8), pages 3821-3842, August.
    25. Hwa‐Sung Kim, 2020. "Investment Decisions, Debt Renegotiation Friction, and Agency Conflicts," International Review of Finance, International Review of Finance Ltd., vol. 20(2), pages 493-504, June.

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