Environmental policy in a differentiated market with a green network effect
We examine the impact of a “green network effect” in a market characterized by consumers' environmental awareness and competition between firms in both environmental quality and product prices. The unique aspect of this model comes from the assumption that an increase in the number of consumers of the green product increases the satisfaction of each green consumer. We show that this externality raises the consumption of the green product, reduces the environmental quality of products and improves welfare, even if it doesn't affect the overall level of pollution. The externality correction requires using three optimal fiscal policies: an ad valorem tax on products, an emission tax, and a subsidy of the green purchase. A second-best optimum can also be reached through the green taxation.
|Date of creation:||23 Dec 2009|
|Date of revision:|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00442460/en/|
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