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Nursing home choice, family bargaining, and optimal policy in a Hotelling economy

Author

Listed:
  • Marie‐louise Leroux

    (UQAM - Université du Québec à Montréal = University of Québec in Montréal, UCL - Université Catholique de Louvain = Catholic University of Louvain)

  • Gregory Ponthiere

    (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, ERUDITE - Equipe de Recherche sur l’Utilisation des Données Individuelles en lien avec la Théorie Economique - UPEC UP12 - Université Paris-Est Créteil Val-de-Marne - Paris 12 - Université Gustave Eiffel, IUF - Institut universitaire de France - M.E.N.E.S.R. - Ministère de l'Education nationale, de l’Enseignement supérieur et de la Recherche)

Abstract

We develop a model of family bargaining to study the impact of the distribution of bargaining power within the family on the choice of nursing homes by families, and on the locations and prices chosen by nursing homes in a Hotelling economy. In the baseline (static) model, where the dependent parent cares only about the location of the nursing home, the markup of nursing homes is increasing in the bargaining power of the dependent parent, and nursing homes are located at the extreme periphery. We compare the laissez-faire with the social optimum (which involves more central locations of nursing homes), and examine its decentralization in first-best and second-best settings. We explore the robustness of our results to introducing a bequest motive in a dynamic overlapping generations model, which allows us to study the joint dynamics of wealth accumulation and nursing home prices. If the bequest motive is strong, the markup is decreasing in the bargaining power of the dependent. However, wealth accumulation, by reducing interest rates, raises markup rates and nursing homes prices.

Suggested Citation

  • Marie‐louise Leroux & Gregory Ponthiere, 2020. "Nursing home choice, family bargaining, and optimal policy in a Hotelling economy," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-03957863, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-03957863
    DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12327
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    Cited by:

    1. Ponthiere, Gregory & Thibault, Emmanuel, 2023. "Life Expectancy, Income and Long-Term Care: The Preston Curve Reexamined," GLO Discussion Paper Series 1335, Global Labor Organization (GLO).
    2. Rabah Amir & Helmuth Cremer & Rim Lahmandi‐Ayed, 2020. "Introduction to the thematic issue on government‐provided services," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(4), pages 839-844, August.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D10 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - General
    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health

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