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Jeux de politique environnementale: une approche en termes de lobbying

Listed author(s):
  • Adel Ben Youssef

    ()

    (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - CNRS - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis)

  • Ludovic Ragni

    ()

    (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - CNRS - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis)

Cet article a pour objet de montre, sur la base d'un jeu à deux étapes, comment s'établissent les propositions de deux candidats à une élection lorsque leur campagne électorales sont fiancées par deux groupes de pression et utilisant des technologies respectivement propres et polluantes. On montre, quand la politique repose sur la mise en place de taxe quelles doivent être les propositions des candidats quand aucun d'entre eux n'admet de préférences spécifiques en matière d'écologie. On indique ensuite quel niveau de taxation doivent être annoncés lorsque les candidats sont respectivement défenseurs et neutres vis à vis de l'environnement. On démontre lorsqu'il est possible d'envisager des restrictions quantitatives de biens polluants pourquoi les candidats ont intérêt à annoncer un même niveau de restriction. Pour finir, on explicite dans quelle situation il est préférable d'envisager une politique de restriction plutôt que de taxation.

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File URL: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00998290/document
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Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number halshs-00998290.

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Date of creation: 1998
Publication status: Published in Economie Appliquée, Presses de l'ISMEA, 1998, 1 (1), pp.109-130
Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00998290
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00998290
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