IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/halshs-00720785.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Syndication in private equity industry: comparing the strategies of independent and captive venture capitalists

Author

Listed:
  • Eric Nasica

    () (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis - UCA - Université Côte d'Azur)

  • Dominique Torre

    () (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis - UCA - Université Côte d'Azur)

  • Dominique Dufour

    () (GRM - Groupe de Recherche en Management - EA 4711 - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis - UCA - Université Côte d'Azur - IAE Toulon - Institut d'Administration des Entreprises (IAE) - Toulon - Institut d'Administration des Entreprises (IAE) - Nice - UTLN - Université de Toulon)

Abstract

A crucial factor in the efficiency of a syndicated venture capital investment is the level and the nature of skills of the partners involved. Observation of venture capitalists (VC) syndicates shows that the skills of their members are heterogeneous. Some syndicates involve leaders and partners with different levels of specialization and/or experience; in others all the members have similar skills. The purpose of this paper is to analyze whether this heterogeneity is influenced by the nature of the funders of these syndicated deals: do captive and independent VCs privilege different forms of syndication? The paper is organized as follows. First, we review the main results in the literature on the relationships between skills and choices of syndication, followed by a statistical analysis of the French private equity industry which identifies some stylized facts on the kind of partnerships in syndicated deals, in relation to the nature, independent or captive, of the VCs. Second, we develop a theoretical model to explain these stylized facts. The model analyzes whether the VC is captive or independent can influence the characteristics of the optimal form of partnership set up with the other syndicate members. We obtained a number of interesting results that corroborate the stylized facts highlighted by the French private equity industry.

Suggested Citation

  • Eric Nasica & Dominique Torre & Dominique Dufour, 2011. "Syndication in private equity industry: comparing the strategies of independent and captive venture capitalists," Post-Print halshs-00720785, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00720785
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00720785
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ernst Verwaal & Hans Bruining & Mike Wright & Sophie Manigart & Andy Lockett, 2010. "Resources access needs and capabilities as mediators of the relationship between VC firm size and syndication," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 277-291, April.
    2. Yael V. Hochberg & Alexander Ljungqvist & Yang Lu, 2007. "Whom You Know Matters: Venture Capital Networks and Investment Performance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 62(1), pages 251-301, February.
    3. Rafael Repullo & Javier Suarez, 2004. "Venture Capital Finance: A Security Design Approach," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 8(1), pages 75-108.
    4. Catherine Casamatta, 2003. "Financing and Advising: Optimal Financial Contracts with Venture Capitalists," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(5), pages 2059-2086, October.
    5. Wang, Susheng & Zhou, Hailan, 2004. "Staged financing in venture capital: moral hazard and risks," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 131-155, January.
    6. Lockett, Andy & Wright, Mike, 2001. "The syndication of venture capital investments," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 29(5), pages 375-390, October.
    7. Stefan Arping & Sonia Falconieri, 2010. "Strategic versus financial investors: the role of strategic objectives in financial contracting," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 62(4), pages 691-714, October.
    8. Tereza Tykvová, 2007. "What Do Economists Tell Us About Venture Capital Contracts?," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(1), pages 65-89, February.
    9. Hellmann, Thomas, 2006. "IPOs, acquisitions, and the use of convertible securities in venture capital," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(3), pages 649-679, September.
    10. Paul Gompers & Anna Kovner & Josh Lerner, 2009. "Specialization and Success: Evidence from Venture Capital," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(3), pages 817-844, September.
    11. Jean-Etienne de Bettignies & Gilles Chemla, 2008. "Corporate Venturing, Allocation of Talent, and Competition for Star Managers," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 54(3), pages 505-521, March.
    12. Sahlman, William A., 1990. "The structure and governance of venture-capital organizations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 473-521, October.
    13. Casamatta, Catherine & Haritchabalet, Carole, 2007. "Experience, screening and syndication in venture capital investments," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 368-398, July.
    14. Bottazzi, Laura & Da Rin, Marco & Hellmann, Thomas, 2008. "Who are the active investors?: Evidence from venture capital," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(3), pages 488-512, September.
    15. Mike Wright, 1998. "Venture Capital and Private Equity: A Review and Synthesis," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(5&6), pages 521-570.
    16. Hellmann, Thomas, 2002. "A theory of strategic venture investing," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 285-314, May.
    17. Manigart, Sophie, 1994. "The founding rate of venture capital firms in three European countries (1970-1990)," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 9(6), pages 525-541, November.
    18. Francesca Cornelli & Oved Yosha, 2003. "Stage Financing and the Role of Convertible Securities," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 70(1), pages 1-32.
    19. Tian, Xuan, 2011. "The causes and consequences of venture capital stage financing," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(1), pages 132-159, July.
    20. Manju Puri & Rebecca Zarutskie, 2012. "On the Life Cycle Dynamics of Venture-Capital- and Non-Venture-Capital-Financed Firms," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 67(6), pages 2247-2293, December.
    21. repec:dau:papers:123456789/985 is not listed on IDEAS
    22. Thomas Hellmann & Laura Lindsey & Manju Puri, 2008. "Building Relationships Early: Banks in Venture Capital," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 21(2), pages 513-541, April.
    23. Sapienza, Harry J., 1992. "When do venture capitalists add value?," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 9-27, January.
    24. Mike Wright & Andy Lockett, 2003. "The Structure and Management of Alliances: Syndication in the Venture Capital Industry," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(8), pages 2073-2102, December.
    25. de Bettignies, Jean-Etienne & Brander, James A., 2007. "Financing entrepreneurship: Bank finance versus venture capital," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 22(6), pages 808-832, November.
    26. Miguel Meuleman & Andy Lockett & Sophie Manigart & Mike Wright, 2010. "Partner Selection Decisions in Interfirm Collaborations: The Paradox of Relational Embeddedness," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(6), pages 995-1019, September.
    27. Douglas Cumming, 2008. "Contracts and Exits in Venture Capital Finance," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 21(5), pages 1947-1982, September.
    28. Lerner, Josh, 1995. " Venture Capitalists and the Oversight of Private Firms," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 50(1), pages 301-318, March.
    29. Hopp, Christian, 2008. "Are firms reluctant to engage in inter-organizational exchange relationships with competitors?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(3), pages 348-350, September.
    30. Christian Hopp, 2010. "When do venture capitalists collaborate? Evidence on the driving forces of venture capital syndication," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 417-431, November.
    31. Gupta, Anil K. & Sapienza, Harry J., 1992. "Determinants of venture capital firms' preferences regarding the industry diversity and geographic scope of their investments," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 7(5), pages 347-362, September.
    32. Sapienza, Harry J. & Manigart, Sophie & Vermeir, Wim, 1996. "Venture capitalist governance and value added in four countries," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 11(6), pages 439-469, November.
    33. Gorman, Michael & Sahlman, William A., 1989. "What do venture capitalists do?," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 231-248, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Dominique Dufour & Eric Nasica & Dominique Torre, 2013. "Rendements financiers versus rendements stratégiques : une comparaison des stratégies de syndication des capital-risqueurs captifs et indépendants," Working Papers halshs-00924748, HAL.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00720785. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.