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Are firms' lobbying strategies universal?


  • Madina Rival

    () (GREG - CRC - Groupe de recherche en économie et en gestion - Centre de recherche en comptabilité - CNAM - Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers [CNAM])


Lobbying public decision-makers is an increasingly widespread managerial practice, but has so far attracted little research attention in Europe. This article studies how it is put into practice as a strategy by French and UK firms. An empirical study examines 679 lobbying campaigns (also known as “political action”), that are grouped into categories and described using statistical data analysis techniques. The results highlight a pattern in the corporate lobbying phenomenon: five types of lobbying strategy (that can be described and illustrated) exist for French firms, and four for UK firms. The central theme of discussion is to what extent firms'political strategies are universal or country specific. Tentative explanations can be put forward: implementation of lobbying strategies appears to depend on the type of issues addressed (which could be universal), but also on the country's political environment (which could be country specific). The study shows the interdependent influence of human resources, economic structures and the political environment (laws and the role of the state) on firms' lobbying strategies.

Suggested Citation

  • Madina Rival, 2010. "Are firms' lobbying strategies universal?," Post-Print halshs-00561807, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00561807
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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Madina Rival, 2004. "Le lobbying : une stratégie collective des entreprises face aux pouvoirs publicsLe cas français," Post-Print halshs-00204087, HAL.
    2. José Allouche & Patrice Laroche & Florent Noël, 2008. "Restructurations et performances de l’entreprise:une méta-analyse," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie,, vol. 11(2), pages 105-146, June.
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    lobbying; corporate political strategy; societal effects; data analysis; France and the UK;

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