Why royalties ? Evidence from French distribution networks
This empirical note deals with the contractual design of relationships in distribution networks. In the framework of agency theory, I study the royalty rate as an incentive device for the upstream firm in maintaining brand-name value, using recent French data to estimate probit models. The results are consistent with the analytical framework.
|Date of creation:||2011|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Working paper GATE 2011-02. 2011|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00560208v3|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
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