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The influence of sellers' beliefs and time constraint on a sequential bargaining in an artificial perishable goods market

Author

Listed:
  • Sonia Moulet

    (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Juliette Rouchier

    (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

In this paper we test some hypotheses about the formation of prices through sequential bilateral bargaining on a perishable goods market under the assumption of behavioural learning by buyers and sellers. We constructed a multi-agent simulation model based on a survey concerning the fruit and vegetables market in Marseille, France. In our model, the agents bargain the price of a perishable good. The representation of agents' rationality is inspired by a literature relative to markets of perishable goods (Kirman [6] [7] and Rouchier [18] [19] [20]) as well as on artificial bargaining (Brenner[2], Weisbuch[22]). We study the influence of three parameters (the sellers' initial beliefs concerning the buyers' willingness to pay, the time spent by buyers on the market, and the heterogeneity in the sellers' limit value) on the evolution of prices and of agents' representations of others agents. We compare our results with empirical observations and some existing literature on bargaining. We find that our assumptions concerning the learning process give consistent results and lead the transactions prices to converge toward the sellers' limit value.

Suggested Citation

  • Sonia Moulet & Juliette Rouchier, 2008. "The influence of sellers' beliefs and time constraint on a sequential bargaining in an artificial perishable goods market," Post-Print halshs-00550506, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00550506
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2005.10.014
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Renaud Bourlès & Juliette Rouchier, 2012. "Evolving Informal Risk-Sharing Cooperatives and Other-Regarding Preferences," Working Papers halshs-00793706, HAL.
    2. Victorien Barbet & Renaud Bourlès & Juliette Rouchier, 2020. "Informal risk-sharing cooperatives: the effect of learning and other-regarding preferences," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 451-478, April.
    3. Alan Kirman & Sonia Moulet & Rainer Schulz, 2008. "Price Discrimination and Customer Behaviour: Empirical Evidence from Marseille," Working Papers halshs-00349036, HAL.

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