IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/halshs-00350373.html

Regional tax competition : Evidence from French regions

Author

Listed:
  • Emmanuelle Reulier

    (CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Yvon Rocaboy

    (CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

Two mechanisms can lead to fiscal strategic interactions between local jurisdictions. The first is due to the tax base mobility. Authorities use fiscal variables to attract new resources. The second is related to information asymmetries between the politicians and the constituency. To reduce these asymmetries, voters can compare their fiscal situation with the one in neighbouring jurisdictions. These two channels lead to what can be referred to as 'mobility-led' and 'information-led' tax competition. This paper aims to discriminate between these two tax competition models in the case of the French regions. The econometric tests suggest that when taxes are paid by voters, the politicians in office seem to be involved in an 'information-led' tax competition, while in the case of taxes paid by firms, the mobility of the tax base seems to be the best way to explain strategic fiscal interactions.

Suggested Citation

  • Emmanuelle Reulier & Yvon Rocaboy, 2009. "Regional tax competition : Evidence from French regions," Post-Print halshs-00350373, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00350373
    DOI: 10.1080/00343400801932334
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a
    for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Sylvie Charlot & Sonia Paty & Virginie Piguet, 2015. "Does Fiscal Cooperation Increase Local Tax Rates in Urban Areas?," Regional Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 49(10), pages 1706-1721, October.
    2. Zhang, Haotian & Lu, Shengfeng & Chen, Sixia, 2024. "Does centralization of tax administration regulate tax competition? Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment in China," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 1084-1098.
    3. Swianiewicz Paweł & Łukomska Julita, 2016. "Local Tax Competition in Poland?," Miscellanea Geographica. Regional Studies on Development, Sciendo, vol. 20(3), pages 37-43, September.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00350373. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.