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Regional tax competition : Evidence from French regions

Listed author(s):
  • Emmanuelle Reulier

    (CREM - Centre de Recherche en Economie et Management - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1 - Université de Caen Basse-Normandie - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Yvon Rocaboy

    (CREM - Centre de Recherche en Economie et Management - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1 - Université de Caen Basse-Normandie - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Two mechanisms can lead to fiscal strategic interactions between local jurisdictions. The first is due to the tax base mobility. Authorities use fiscal variables to attract new resources. The second is related to information asymmetries between the politicians and the constituency. To reduce these asymmetries, voters can compare their fiscal situation with the one in neighbouring jurisdictions. These two channels lead to what can be referred to as 'mobility-led' and 'information-led' tax competition. This paper aims to discriminate between these two tax competition models in the case of the French regions. The econometric tests suggest that when taxes are paid by voters, the politicians in office seem to be involved in an 'information-led' tax competition, while in the case of taxes paid by firms, the mobility of the tax base seems to be the best way to explain strategic fiscal interactions.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number halshs-00350373.

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Date of creation: 2009
Publication status: Published in Regional Studies, Taylor & Francis (Routledge), 2009, 43 (7), pp.915 - 922. <10.1080/00343400801932334>
Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00350373
DOI: 10.1080/00343400801932334
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00350373
Contact details of provider: Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/

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