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Préférences temporelles et recherche d'emploi « Applications économétriques sur le panel Européen des Ménages »

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  • Mohamed Ben Halima

    () (GATE - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - Ecole Normale Supérieure Lettres et Sciences Humaines - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Bassem Ben Halima

    (GATE - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - Ecole Normale Supérieure Lettres et Sciences Humaines - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

The rate of time preference is an important component of decisions, such as the choice of reservation wage or search effort. More impatient workers search less intensively and set a lower reservation wage. The effect on the exit rate from unemployment is unclear. According to the model of Della Vigna and Paserman [2005], time preferences are separate in exponential and hyperbolic preferences. If agents have hyperbolic preferences, the search effort dominates reservation wage, so increase in impatience lead to lower exit rate. Using the French sample of European Household Panel Survey (EHPS), we prove that search effort has a strong effect on the exit rate from unemployment whereas reservation wage is not significant. This final result informs us that the individuals have hyperbolic preferences.

Suggested Citation

  • Mohamed Ben Halima & Bassem Ben Halima, 2008. "Préférences temporelles et recherche d'emploi « Applications économétriques sur le panel Européen des Ménages »," Post-Print halshs-00333531, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00333531 Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00333531
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    time preference; hyperbolic discounting; job search; duration model; préférence temporelles; escompte hyperbolique; recherche d'emploi; modèle de durée;

    JEL classification:

    • D90 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - General
    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
    • C41 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Duration Analysis; Optimal Timing Strategies

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