« Éviter le mal ou... faire le bien » : gestion des biens environnementaux et politiques de développement durable Une étude expérimentale
Environmental policies provide agents with incentives to contribute to environmental protection. One concern of such policies is to create and/or maintain a variety of valuable public goods. One main difference between creating and maintaining public goods is that, while in the former, agents are asked to create environmental goods, in the latter, they have to maintain unchanged an existing level of environmental good. This paper aims to test this framing effect. Our approach relies on public goods experiments. Our results show that individuals are less cooperative under a maintaining context than under a creating context. Classification JEL : C9 ; C92 ; H41 ; Q2 ; Q5
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|Date of creation:||2008|
|Publication status:||Published in Revue Economique, Presses de Sciences Po, 2008, 59 (3), pp.685-692|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00326475|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
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