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Pourquoi évaluer son partenaire lors d'une transaction à la ebay ; une approche expérimentale

Author

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  • David Masclet

    (CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1 - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Thierry Pénard

    () (CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1 - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

Several online market sites, such as eBay, have implemented reputation management mechanisms in order to improve cooperation. In this article, we aim at investigating the emergence of trust and cooperation in presence of reputation mechanism. In a series of experiments based on the trust game introduced by Berg Dickhault and McCabe (1995) , we examine different reputation systems. Our experimental design, thus, involves several treatments depending on the reputation system involved: simultaneous evaluation, sequential evaluation, evaluation with endogeneous choice in the moment of the evaluation. Our results indicate that reputation systems increase both the level of trust and the level of cooperation. However, our study also shed light on the limits of such systems. Indeed, evaluation can be used in a strategic way or in reprisal to received evaluation, that may attenuate its efficiency.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • David Masclet & Thierry Pénard, 2006. "Pourquoi évaluer son partenaire lors d'une transaction à la ebay ; une approche expérimentale," Post-Print halshs-00106865, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00106865 Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00106865
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Getmansky, Mila & Lo, Andrew W. & Makarov, Igor, 2004. "An econometric model of serial correlation and illiquidity in hedge fund returns," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(3), pages 529-609, December.
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    7. Nandini Chandar, 2002. "Incentives, Discretion, and Asset Valuation in Closed-End Mutual Funds," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(4), pages 1037-1070, September.
    8. Quan, Daniel C & Quigley, John M, 1991. "Price Formation and the Appraisal Function in Real Estate Markets," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 127-146, June.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Confiance; Economie expérimentale; évaluation; réciprocité; Evaluation : Reciprocity; Experimental Economics; Trust; E-commerce;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior

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