Incentives to implement personalized medicine under second‐best pricing
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1002/hec.4588
Download full text from publisher
To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Other versions of this item:
- Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2022. "Incentives to implement personalized medicine under second‐best pricing," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 31(11), pages 2411-2424, November.
References listed on IDEAS
- Mougeot, Michel & Naegelen, Florence, 2005.
"Hospital price regulation and expenditure cap policy,"
Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 55-72, January.
- Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2005. "Hospital price regulation and expenditure cap policy," Post-Print hal-00448922, HAL.
- Bardey, David & Kembou, Samuel & Ventelou, Bruno, 2021.
"Physicians’ incentives to adopt personalised medicine: Experimental evidence,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 191(C), pages 686-713.
- David Bardey & Samuel Kembou Nzalé & Bruno Ventelou, 2018. "Physicians’ incentives to adopt personalized medicine: experimental evidence," Documentos CEDE 16969, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
- David Bardey & Samuel Kembou & Bruno Ventelou, 2021. "Physicians’ incentives to adopt personalised medicine: Experimental evidence," Post-Print hal-03420688, HAL.
- Bardey, David & Kembou Nzalé, Samuel & Ventelou, Bruno, 2018. "Physicians’ incentives to adopt personalized medicine: experimental evidence," TSE Working Papers 18-968, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- David Bardey & Samuel Kembou Nzale & Bruno Ventelou, 2018. "Physicians’ Incentives to Adopt Personalized Medicine: Experimental Evidence," AMSE Working Papers 1823, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France.
- David Bardey & Samuel Kembou Nzalé & Bruno Ventelou, 2018. "Physicians' Incentives to Adopt Personalized Medicine: Experimental Evidence," Working Papers halshs-01928128, HAL.
- Ma, Ching-to Albert, 1994.
"Health Care Payment Systems: Cost and Quality Incentives,"
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(1), pages 93-112, Spring.
- Ching-to Albert Ma, 1994. "Health Care Payment Systems: Cost and Quality Incentives," Papers 0047, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
- Stéphane Alcenat & François Maréchal & Florence Naegelen, 2021. "Implementation of personalized medicine in a context of moral hazard and uncertainty about treatment efficacy," International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 81-97, March.
- Mougeot, Michel & Naegelen, Florence, 2005.
"Hospital price regulation and expenditure cap policy,"
Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 55-72, January.
- Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2005. "Hospital price regulation and expenditure cap policy," Post-Print hal-00448922, HAL.
- Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2005. "Hospital Price Regulation and Expenditure Cap Policy," Post-Print hal-00448979, HAL.
- Ching‐to Albert Ma, 1994.
"Health Care Payment Systems: Cost and Quality Incentives,"
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(1), pages 93-112, March.
- Ma, Ching-to Albert, 1994. "Health Care Payment Systems: Cost and Quality Incentives," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(1), pages 93-112, Spring.
- Ching-to Albert Ma, 1994. "Health Care Payment Systems: Cost and Quality Incentives," Papers 0047, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Bardey, David & De Donder , Philippe & Zaporozhets , Vera, 2024. "Economic Incentives to Develop and to Use Diagnostic Tests a Literature Review," Documentos CEDE 21024, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
- De Donder, Philippe & Bardey, David & Zaporozhets, Vera, 2024.
"Economic Incentives to Develop and to Use Diagnostic Tests - A Literature Review,"
TSE Working Papers
24-1507, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- David Bardey & Philippe de Donder & Vera Zaporozhets, 2024. "Economic Incentives to Develop and to Use Diagnostic Tests - A Literature Review," Working Papers hal-04472497, HAL.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Oddvar Kaarboe & Luigi Siciliani, 2011.
"Multi‐tasking, quality and pay for performance,"
Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 20(2), pages 225-238, February.
- Kaarboe, Oddvar Martin & Siciliani, Luigi, 2008. "Multitasking, Quality and Pay for Performance," CEPR Discussion Papers 6911, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Kaarbøe, Oddvar M. & Siciliani, Luigi, 2011. "Multitasking, Quality and Pay for Performance," Working Papers in Economics 07/08, University of Bergen, Department of Economics.
- Oddvar Martin Kaarboe & Luigi Siciliani, 2008. "Multitasking, quality and pay for performance," Discussion Papers 08/06, Department of Economics, University of York.
- Siciliani, Luigi, 2006. "Selection of treatment under prospective payment systems in the hospital sector," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 479-499, May.
- François Maréchal & Lionel Thomas, 2019. "The optimal payment system for hospitals under adverse selection, moral hazard, and limited liability," Working Papers 2019-04, CRESE.
- Elin Johanna Gudrun Hafsteinsdottir & Luigi Siciliani, 2010.
"DRG prospective payment systems: refine or not refine?,"
Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 19(10), pages 1226-1239, October.
- Luigi Siciliani & Elín J. G. Hafsteinsdóttir, 2008. "DRG prospective payment system: refine or not refine?," Discussion Papers 08/29, Department of Economics, University of York.
- Makoto Kakinaka & Ryuta Kato, 2013.
"Regulated medical fee schedule of the Japanese health care system,"
International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 301-317, December.
- Makoto Kakinaka & Ryuta Ray Kato, 2011. "Regulated Medical Fee Schedule of the Japanese Health Care System," Working Papers EMS_2011_13, Research Institute, International University of Japan.
- Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2009. "Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard, and Outlier Payment Policy," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 76(1), pages 177-195, March.
- Ma, Ching-to Albert & Mak, Henry Y., 2015.
"Information disclosure and the equivalence of prospective payment and cost reimbursement,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 439-452.
- Ching-to Albert MA & Henry Y. Mak, 2012. "Information Disclosure and the Equivalence of Prospective Payment and Cost Reimbursement," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2012-008, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- Ching-to Albert Ma & Henry Y. Mak, 2013. "Information Disclosure and the Equivalence of Prospective Payment and Cost Reimbursement," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 2013-018, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- Luigi Siciliani & Anderson Stanciole, 2013.
"Bargaining and the provision of health services,"
The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 14(3), pages 391-406, June.
- Luigi Siciliani & Anderson Stanciol, 2008. "Bargaining and the Provision of Health Services," Discussion Papers 08/28, Department of Economics, University of York.
- Miraldo, Marisa & Siciliani, Luigi & Street, Andrew, 2011.
"Price adjustment in the hospital sector,"
Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 112-125, January.
- Marisa Miraldo & Luigi Siciliani & Andrew Street, 2008. "Price Adjustment in the Hospital Sector," Working Papers 041cherp, Centre for Health Economics, University of York.
- Kuhn, Michael & Siciliani, Luigi, 2013. "Manipulation and auditing of public sector contracts," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 251-267.
- Kuhn, Michael & Siciliani, Luigi, 2008. "Upcoding and Optimal Auditing in Health Care (or The economics of DRG creep)," CEPR Discussion Papers 6689, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- David Crainich & Hervé Leleu & Ana Mauleon, 2011.
"Hospital’s activity-based financing system and manager: physician interaction,"
The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 12(5), pages 417-427, October.
- D. Crainich & H. Leleu & A. Mauleon, 2006. "Hospital's activity-based financing system and manager-physician interaction," Post-Print hal-00246210, HAL.
- CRAINICH, David & LELEU, Hervé & MAULEON, Ana, 2011. "Hospital's activity-based financing system and manager: physician interaction," LIDAM Reprints CORE 2323, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- D. Crainich & H. Leleu & A. Mauleon, 2006. "Hospital's activity-based financing system and manager - physician interaction," Post-Print hal-00259566, HAL.
- CRAINICH, David & LELEU, Hervé & MAULEON, Ana, 2006. "Hospital’s activity-based financing system and manager-physician interaction," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2006029, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- D. Crainich & H. Leleu & A. Mauléon, 2011. "Hospital's activity-based financing system and manager physician interaction," Post-Print hal-00657024, HAL.
- Bardey, David & Canta, Chiara & Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie, 2012.
"The regulation of health care providers’ payments when horizontal and vertical differentiation matter,"
Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 691-704.
- BARDEY, David & CANTA, Chiara & LOZACHMEUR, Jean-Marie, 2012. "The regulation of health care providers' payments when horizontal and vertical differentiation matter," LIDAM Reprints CORE 2441, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Nuscheler, Robert & Roeder, Kerstin, 2015.
"Financing and funding health care: Optimal policy and political implementability,"
Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 197-208.
- Robert Nuscheler & Kerstin Roeder, 2014. "Financing and Funding Health Care: Optimal Policy and Political Implementability," CESifo Working Paper Series 4893, CESifo.
- Seungchul Lee & Robert Rosenman, 2013.
"Reimbursement and Investment: Prospective Payment and For-Profit Hospitals’ Market Share,"
Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 503-518, December.
- Seungchul Lee & Robert Rosenman, 2012. "Reimbursement and Investment: Propsective Payment and For-Profit Hospitals' Market Share," Working Papers 2012-3, School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University.
- Barros, Pedro Pita, 2003. "Cream-skimming, incentives for efficiency and payment system," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 419-443, May.
- Kümpel, Christian & Schneider, Udo, 2020. "Additional reimbursement for outpatient physicians treating nursing home residents reduces avoidable hospital admissions: Results of a reimbursement change in Germany," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 124(4), pages 470-477.
- Jasmin Kantarevic & Boris Kralj, 2016.
"Physician Payment Contracts in the Presence of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection: The Theory and Its Application in Ontario,"
Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 25(10), pages 1326-1340, October.
- Kantarevic, Jasmin & Kralj, Boris, 2015. "Physician Payment Contracts in the Presence of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection: The Theory and its Application to Ontario," IZA Discussion Papers 9142, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Miller, Nolan, 2004. "Market Structure, Commitment, and Treatment Incentives in Health Care," Working Paper Series rwp04-007, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
- Paolo Pertile, 2008. "Investment in Health Technologies in a Competitive Model with Real Options," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 10(5), pages 923-952, October.
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04353272. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.