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Out by the door, in through the window: Politics and natural gas regulation in Russia

Author

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  • Claude Ménard

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, UP1 UFR02 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - École d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne)

  • Alexander Kurdin

    (Lomonosov Moscow State University - Faculty of Computational Mathematics and Cybernetics - Moscow State University, HSE - Vysšaja škola èkonomiki = National Research University Higher School of Economics [Moscow])

  • Andrey Shastitko

    (Lomonosov Moscow State University - Faculty of Computational Mathematics and Cybernetics - Moscow State University, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration)

Abstract

This article deals with the regulation of the natural gas sector in Russia through the lens of institutional economics. It proposes a framework in which ‘meso-institutions' bridge the gap between the macro-institutions shaping the ‘rules of the game,' with the Kremlin at the core, and the micro-layer within which firms operate. We argue that the slow reform process comes from conflicts of interest embedded in these meso-institutions, specifically: the Federal Antimonopoly Service, the Ministry of Energy, and the Ministry of Economic Development. Based on official documents, data from various public sources, and semi-directive interviews and discussions, our analysis shows that parties are locked in a sub-optimal equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Claude Ménard & Alexander Kurdin & Andrey Shastitko, 2020. "Out by the door, in through the window: Politics and natural gas regulation in Russia," Post-Print hal-03534650, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03534650
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jup.2020.101051
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. James Henderson & Arild Moe, 2019. "The Globalization of Russian Gas," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 18923.
    2. Tarr, David G., 2010. "Export restraints on russian natural gas and raw timber : what are the economic impacts ?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5195, The World Bank.
    3. Alston,Eric & Alston,Lee J. & Mueller,Bernardo & Nonnenmacher,Tomas, 2018. "Institutional and Organizational Analysis," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107451254.
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    6. Claude Ménard & Mary M. Shirley (ed.), 2018. "A Research Agenda for New Institutional Economics," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 17960.
    7. Idrisov Georgy & Gordeev Dmitry, 2017. "Theoretical and Practical Aspects of Natural Gas Pricing in Domestic and Foreign Markets: The Case of Russia," Working Papers wpaper-2017-274, Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy, revised 2017.
    8. Oliver E. Williamson, 2000. "The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(3), pages 595-613, September.
    9. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, April.
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    11. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521840187 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Claude Ménard & Alejandro Jimenez & Hakan Tropp, 2018. "Addressing the policy-implementation gaps in water services: the key role of meso-institutions," Water International, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 43(1), pages 13-33, January.
    13. North,Douglass C. & Wallis,John Joseph & Weingast,Barry R., 2013. "Violence and Social Orders," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107646995.
    14. Skarbek, David, 2020. "Qualitative research methods for institutional analysis," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 16(4), pages 409-422, August.
    15. North, Douglass C., 1971. "Institutional Change and Economic Growth," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 31(1), pages 118-125, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Claude Ménard & Ivan Shabalov & Andrey Shastitko, 2021. "Institutions to the rescue: Untangling industrial fragmentation, institutional misalignment, and political constraints in the Russian gas pipeline industry," Post-Print hal-04012224, HAL.

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