IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/hal-03268865.html

Trade credit contracts: Design and regulation

Author

Listed:
  • Florina Silaghi

    (UAB - Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona = Autonomous University of Barcelona = Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona)

  • Franck Moraux

    (CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

This paper provides a theoretical analysis of trade credit within a real options framework. We show that under trade credit the buyer delays the decision to stop production, getting closer to the supply chain optimal stopping decision. Therefore, trade credit may serve as a coordination device. The supplier can optimally choose to offer trade credit for free, since this will guarantee her business for a longer period of time. Optimal trade credit design is analyzed for an integrated supply chain (cooperative solution) and for external procurement (Nash bargaining and Stackelberg solutions). When regulation imposes a limit on trade credit maturity, the wholesale price is reduced, trade credit decreases and internal procurement increases. The model's predictions are in line with recent empirical evidence on the effects of regulation in the retail industry.

Suggested Citation

  • Florina Silaghi & Franck Moraux, 2022. "Trade credit contracts: Design and regulation," Post-Print hal-03268865, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03268865
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2021.04.036
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-03268865
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://hal.science/hal-03268865/document
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.ejor.2021.04.036?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Wang, Kai & Lin, Jun & Liu, Guoquan & Liu, Qi, 2022. "Strategic introduction of logistics retail and finance under competition and channel spillover," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 165(C).
    2. Shanshan Xie & Jiamuyan Xie, 2025. "Demand Information Asymmetry and Supply Chain Financing: A Signaling Perspective," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 13(8), pages 1-27, April.
    3. Priya, Bhawna & Biswas, Indranil & Agrawal, Anupam, 2023. "The over-ordering problem in trade credit: Role of return policies," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 309(2), pages 731-744.
    4. Xie, Xiaofeng & Chen, Xiangfeng & Xu, Xun & Gu, Jing, 2024. "Financing a dual capital-constrained supply chain: Profit enhancement and diffusion effect of default risk," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 181(C).
    5. Yue Zhang & Bin Zhang & Rongguang Chen, 2025. "Financing Newsvendor with Trade Credit and Bank Credit Portfolio," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 13(9), pages 1-25, April.
    6. Shilpy & Avadhesh Kumar, 2025. "Evaluating Supply Chain Finance Instruments for SMEs: A Stackelberg Approach to Sustainable Supply Chains Under Government Support," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 17(15), pages 1-25, August.
    7. Du, Ningning & Yan, Yingchen & Qin, Zhongfeng, 2023. "Analysis of financing strategy in coopetition supply chain with opportunity cost," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 305(1), pages 85-100.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G13 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Contingent Pricing; Futures Pricing

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03268865. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.