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Foreign bank lending and information asymmetries in China: Empirical evidence from the syndicated loan market

Author

Listed:
  • Pierre Pessarossi
  • Christophe J. Godlewski

    (LARGE - Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg)

  • Laurent Weill

    (LARGE - Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg)

Abstract

This paper considers whether information asymmetries affect the willingness of foreign banks to participate in syndicated loans to corporate borrowers in China. We analyze how ownership concentration, which influences information asymmetries in the relationship between the borrower and the lender, exerts an impact on the participation of foreign banks in syndicated loans granted to Chinese borrowers in the period 2004–2009. We observe that greater ownership concentration of the borrowing firm does not positively influence participation of foreign banks in the loan syndicate. We conclude that information asymmetries are not exacerbated for foreign banks relative to local banks in China.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Pierre Pessarossi & Christophe J. Godlewski & Laurent Weill, 2012. "Foreign bank lending and information asymmetries in China: Empirical evidence from the syndicated loan market," Post-Print hal-03047767, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03047767
    DOI: 10.1016/j.asieco.2012.03.006
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    Cited by:

    1. Chen, Ting-Hsuan & Chou, Hsiu-Hsia & Chang, Yuan & Fang, Hao, 2015. "The effect of excess lending on bank liquidity : Evidence from China," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 54-68.
    2. Korkeamäki, Timo & Pöyry, Salla & Suo, Maiju, 2014. "Credit ratings and information asymmetry on the Chinese syndicated loan market," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 1-16.
    3. Pessarossi, Pierre & Weill, Laurent, 2013. "Choice of corporate debt in China: The role of state ownership," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 26(C), pages 1-16.
    4. Luqiao Zhang & Biao Mi & Yun Shen & Liang Han, 2023. "When in Rome, do as the Romans do: loan syndication in a state-dominated market," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 60(4), pages 1469-1494, May.
    5. Bing Xu & Honglin Wang & Adrian Van Rixtel, 2015. "Do banks extract informational rents through collateral?," BIS Working Papers 522, Bank for International Settlements.
    6. Bing Xu & Honglin Wang & Adrian Van Rixtel, 2015. "Do banks extract informational rents through collateral?," BIS Working Papers 522, Bank for International Settlements.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • P34 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Finance

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