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Founding Family Firms, CEO Incentive Pay, and Dual Agency Problems

Author

Listed:
  • Mieszko Mazur

    (LEM - Lille économie management - UMR 9221 - UA - Université d'Artois - UCL - Université catholique de Lille - Université de Lille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Betty H.T. Wu

    (University of Glasgow Adam Smith Business School)

Abstract

This paper contributes to the literature on agency theory by examining relations between family involvement and CEO compensation. Using a panel of 362 small U.S. listed firms, we analyze how founding families influence firm performance through option portfolio price sensitivity. Consistent with the dual agency framework, we find that family firms have lower CEO incentive pay, which is further reduced by higher executive ownership. Interestingly, such incentive pay offsets the positive impact that families have on firm valuation. Collectively, our results show that, compared with nonfamily firms, lower incentive pay adopted by family firms due to lower agency costs mitigates the direct effect of family involvement on firm performance. Once accounting for CEO incentive pay, we do not observe performance differences between family and nonfamily firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Mieszko Mazur & Betty H.T. Wu, 2016. "Founding Family Firms, CEO Incentive Pay, and Dual Agency Problems," Post-Print hal-02998205, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02998205
    DOI: 10.1111/jsbm.12237
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Clara Graziano & Laura Rondi, 2021. "Product Market Competition, Executive Compensation, and CEO Family Ties," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 58(3), pages 357-397, May.
    2. Schierstedt, Bennet & Henn, Marisa & Lutz, Eva, 2020. "Diversified acquisitions in family firms: Restricted vs. extended family priorities," Journal of Family Business Strategy, Elsevier, vol. 11(2).
    3. Hussingera, Katrin & Issahd, Wunnam, 2022. "Trade secret protection and R&D investment of family firms," ZEW Discussion Papers 22-039, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    4. James J. Cordeiro & Giorgia Profumo & Ilaria Tutore, 2021. "Family ownership and stockholder reactions to environmental performance disclosure: A test of secondary agency relationships," Business Strategy and the Environment, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(4), pages 2091-2107, May.
    5. Miaowei Peng & Xue Tan, 2023. "Does controlling persons’ foreign residency rights influence executive compensation?," Review of Managerial Science, Springer, vol. 17(7), pages 2375-2416, October.
    6. Lozano-Reina, Gabriel & Sánchez-Marín, Gregorio & Baixauli-Soler, J. Samuel, 2022. "Say-on-Pay voting dispersion in listed family and non-family firms: A panel data analysis," Journal of Family Business Strategy, Elsevier, vol. 13(1).
    7. Avinash Ghalke & Arunima Haldar & Satish Kumar, 2023. "Family firm ownership and its impact on performance: evidence from an emerging market," Review of Managerial Science, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 493-512, February.
    8. Katrin Hussinger & Wunnam Basit Issah, 2022. "Trade Secret Protection and R&D Investment of Family Firms," DEM Discussion Paper Series 22-11, Department of Economics at the University of Luxembourg.
    9. Danilo Bertoni & Daniele Cavicchioli & Laure Latruffe, 2023. "Impact of business transfer on economic performance: the case of Italian family farms," International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Small Business, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 48(2), pages 186-213.
    10. Jenny Kragl & Alberto Palermo & Guoqian Xi & Joern Block, 2023. "Hiring family or non-family managers when non-economic (sustainability) goals matter? A multitask agency model," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 61(2), pages 675-700, August.
    11. James J. Cordeiro & Giorgia Profumo & Ilaria Tutore, 2020. "Board gender diversity and corporate environmental performance: The moderating role of family and dual‐class majority ownership structures," Business Strategy and the Environment, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(3), pages 1127-1144, March.
    12. Waldkirch, Matthias, 2020. "Non-family CEOs in family firms: Spotting gaps and challenging assumptions for a future research agenda," Journal of Family Business Strategy, Elsevier, vol. 11(1).
    13. Pattarin Adithipyangkul & H. Y. Hung & T. Y. Leung, 2021. "An Auditor's Perspective of Executive Incentive Pay and Dividend Payouts in Family Firms," Journal of Family and Economic Issues, Springer, vol. 42(4), pages 697-714, December.

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