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Hotel Rankings of Online Travel Agents, Channel Pricing and Consumer Protection

Author

Listed:
  • Matthias Hunold

    (DICE - Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics - Heinrich Heine Universität Düsseldorf = Heinrich Heine University [Düsseldorf])

  • Reinhold Kesler

    (Centre for European Economic Research (Mannheim, Germany) - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) - University of Mannheim = Universität Mannheim, UZH - Universität Zürich [Zürich] = University of Zurich)

  • Ulrich Laitenberger

    (Centre for European Economic Research (Mannheim, Germany) - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) - University of Mannheim = Universität Mannheim, SES - Département Sciences Economiques et Sociales - Télécom Paris - IMT - Institut Mines-Télécom [Paris] - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris, ECOGE - Economie Gestion - I3 SES - Institut interdisciplinaire de l’innovation de Telecom Paris - Télécom Paris - IMT - Institut Mines-Télécom [Paris] - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris - I3 - Institut interdisciplinaire de l’innovation - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

We investigate whether online travel agents (OTAs) assign hotels worse positions in their search results if these set lower hotel prices at other OTAs or on their own websites. We formally characterize how an OTA can use such a strategy to reduce price differentiation across distribution channels. Our empirical analysis shows that the position of a hotel in the search results of OTAs is better when the prices charged by the hotel on other channels are higher. This is consistent with the hypothesis that OTAs alter their search results to discipline hotels for aggressive prices on competing channels, thereby reducing the search quality for consumers.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Matthias Hunold & Reinhold Kesler & Ulrich Laitenberger, 2019. "Hotel Rankings of Online Travel Agents, Channel Pricing and Consumer Protection," Post-Print hal-02163741, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02163741
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    Cited by:

    1. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. M. Narciso, 2022. "The Unreliability of Online Review Mechanisms," Journal of Consumer Policy, Springer, vol. 45(3), pages 349-368, September.
    3. Paul Belleflamme & Martin Peitz, 2018. "Inside the engine room of digital platforms: Reviews, ratings, and recommendations," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2018_004, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    4. Maximilian Schäfer & Kevin Ducbao Tran, 2020. "Airbnb, Hotels, and Localized Competition," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1889, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    5. Peitz, Martin, 2020. "Economic policy for digital attention intermediaries," ZEW Discussion Papers 20-035, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    6. Joan Calzada & Nestor Duch-Brown & Ricard Gil, 2021. "Do search engines increase concentration in media markets?," UB School of Economics Working Papers 2021/415, University of Barcelona School of Economics.
    7. Renato Gomes & Andrea Mantovani, 2025. "Regulating Platform Fees under Price Parity," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 23(1), pages 190-235.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - General
    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
    • L81 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce

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