Couverture, coûts d’agence et taille d’une entreprise
This article analyses the hedging demand of a firm,where hedging helps to reduce the agency costs between stockholdersand one or several risk averse agents. We show that when a merger bet-ween two firms implies less information, the hedging demand of the newfirm is generally higher than the hedging demands of the firms before mer-ger. This is due to the loss of information and because hedging allows toreduce the risk borne by several agents.
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|Date of creation:||2004|
|Publication status:||Published in Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, INSEE-GENES, 2004|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01275757|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
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