Fight Cartels or Control Mergers? On the Optimal Allocation of enforcement Efforts within Competition Policy
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2012.10.002
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00977619
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Cosnita-Langlais, Andreea & Tropeano, Jean-Philippe, 2013. "Fight cartels or control mergers? On the optimal allocation of enforcement efforts within competition policy," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 34-40.
- Andreea Cosnita & Jean-Philippe Tropeano, 2013. "Fight Cartels or Control Mergers? On the Optimal Allocation of enforcement Efforts within Competition Policy," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-00977619, HAL.
- Andreea Cosnita & Jean-Philippe Tropeano, 2013. "Fight Cartels or Control Mergers? On the Optimal Allocation of enforcement Efforts within Competition Policy," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00977619, HAL.
- Andreea Cosnita-Langlais & Jean-Philippe Tropeano, 2011. "Fight Cartels or Control Mergers? On the Optimal Allocation of Enforcement Efforts within Competition Policy," Working Papers hal-04140991, HAL.
- Andreea Cosnita-Langlais & Jean-Philippe Tropeano, 2011. "Fight Cartels or Control Mergers? On the Optimal Allocation of Enforcement Efforts within Competition Policy," EconomiX Working Papers 2011-18, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
References listed on IDEAS
- Motta,Massimo, 2004.
"Competition Policy,"
Cambridge Books,
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521016919, September.
- Motta,Massimo, 2004. "Competition Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521816632, September.
- Farrell, Joseph & Shapiro, Carl, 1990.
"Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 107-126, March.
- Farrell, J. & Shapiro, C., 1988. "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis," Papers 17, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper.
- Farrell, Joseph & Shapiro, Carl, 1988. "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt0tp305nx, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro., 1988. "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis," Economics Working Papers 8880, University of California at Berkeley.
- Cécile Aubert & Jérôme Pouyet, 2004.
"Competition policy, regulation and the institutional design of industry supervision,"
Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 70(2), pages 153-168.
- Cécile Aubert & Jérôme Pouyet, 2004. "Competition Policy, Regulation, and the Institutional Design of Industry Supervision," Post-Print hal-00206681, HAL.
- Cécile AUBERT & Jérôme POUYET, 2004. "Competition policy, regulation and the institutional design of industry supervision," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 2004022, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
- Bittlingmayer, George, 1985. "Did Antitrust Policy Cause the Great Merger Wave?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(1), pages 77-118, April.
- Simon J. Evenett & Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, 2001.
"International Cartel Enforcement: Lessons from the 1990s,"
The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(9), pages 1221-1245, September.
- Evenett, Simon J. & Levenstein, Margaret C. & Suslow, Valerie Y., 2001. "International cartel enforcement : lessons from the 1990s," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2680, The World Bank.
- Simon J. Evenett & Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, 2001. "International Cartel Enforcement: Lessons from the 1990s," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2001-01, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
- Lars Sørgard, 2009. "Optimal Merger Policy: Enforcement Vs. Deterrence," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(3), pages 438-456, September.
- Compte, Olivier & Jenny, Frederic & Rey, Patrick, 2002. "Capacity constraints, mergers and collusion," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 1-29, January.
- Dennis Mueller, 1996. "Antimerger policy in the United States: History and lessons," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 23(3), pages 229-253, October.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Pedro P. Barros & Steffen Hoernig & Tore Nilssen, 2015. "Transversal Agency and Crowding Out," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 171(4), pages 589-608, December.
- Boris Begović & Dušan Popović, 2019. "Merger Control and Economic Growth of LDCs: Some Observations and Recommendations," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 54(2), pages 381-408, March.
- Koski, Heli & Pajarinen, Mika, 2013. "Empirical Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Competition Policy," ETLA Working Papers 15, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy.
- Tim Reuter, 2017.
"Endogenous Cartel Organization and Antitrust Fine Discrimination,"
Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 51(3), pages 291-313, November.
- Tim Reuter, 2013. "Endogenous Cartel Organization and Antitrust Fine Discrimination," Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz 2013-09, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
- Stephen Davies & Peter L. Ormosi & Martin Graffenberger, 2014. "Mergers after cartels: How markets react to cartel breakdown," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2014-01, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
- Hüschelrath, Kai & Smuda, Florian, 2013. "Do cartel breakdowns induce mergers? Evidence from EC cartel cases," ZEW Discussion Papers 13-036, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
- Stephen Davies & Peter Ormosi & Martin Graffenberger, 2015. "Mergers after cartels: How markets react to cartel breakdown," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(3).
- Robert M. Feinberg, 2016. "Anti-cartel enforcement and subsequent mergers: state-level evidence for physician groups," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 36(1), pages 365-372.
- Filomena Garcia & Jose Manuel Paz y Miño & Gustavo Torrens, 2020. "The merger paradox, collusion, and competition policy," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(6), pages 2051-2081, December.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Kaplow, Louis & Shapiro, Carl, 2007.
"Antitrust,"
Handbook of Law and Economics, in: A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), Handbook of Law and Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 15, pages 1073-1225,
Elsevier.
- Louis Kaplow & Carl Shapiro, 2007. "Antitrust," NBER Working Papers 12867, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Kaplow, Louis & Shapiro, Carl, 2007. "Antitrust," Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series qt9pt7p9bm, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Cosnita, Andreea & Tropeano, Jean-Philippe, 2009.
"Negotiating remedies: Revealing the merger efficiency gains,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 188-196, March.
- Andreea Cosnita & Jean-Philippe Tropeano, 2005. "Negotiating remedies: revealing the merger efficiency gains," Post-Print halshs-00194906, HAL.
- Jean-Philippe Tropeano & Andreea Cosnita, 2009. "Negotiating remedies: Revealing the merger efficiency gains," Post-Print hal-00643693, HAL.
- Jean-Philippe Tropeano & Andreea Cosnita, 2009. "Negotiating remedies: Revealing the merger efficiency gains," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00643693, HAL.
- Andrea Cosnita & Jean-Philippe Tropeano, 2005. "Negotiating remedies: revealing the merger efficiency gains," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques v05047, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), revised Apr 2006.
- Andreea Cosnita & Jean-Philippe Tropeano, 2005. "Negotiating remedies: revealing the merger efficiency gains," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00194906, HAL.
- Cosnita, A. & Tropeano, J.P., 2008. "Negotiating remedies : revealing the merger efficiency gains," Working Papers 200803, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL).
- Cook, Paul, 2002. "Competition Policy, Market Power and Collusion in Developing Countries," Centre on Regulation and Competition (CRC) Working papers 30681, University of Manchester, Institute for Development Policy and Management (IDPM).
- Patrice Bougette & Florent Venayre, 2008. "Contrôles a priori et a posteriori des concentrations : comment augmenter l'efficacité des politiques de concurrence," Revue d'économie industrielle, De Boeck Université, vol. 0(1), pages 9-40.
- Lionel Janin & Benoît Menoni, 2007.
"L e contrôle des concentrations en France : une analyse empirique des avis du Conseil de la concurrence,"
Economie & Prévision, La Documentation Française, vol. 0(2), pages 93-114.
- Benoît Menoni & Lionel Janin, 2007. "Le contrôle des concentrations en France : une analyse empirique des avis du Conseil de la concurrence," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 178(2), pages 93-114.
- Lionel Janin & Benoît Menoni, 2005. "Le Contrôle des concentrations en France : Une analyse empirique des avis du Conseil de la Concurrence," Working Papers 2005-37, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
- Darai, D. & Roux, C. & Schneider, F., 2019.
"Mergers, Mavericks, and Tacit Collusion,"
Cambridge Working Papers in Economics
1984, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Donja Darai & Catherine Roux & Frédéric Schneider, 2019. "Mergers, mavericks, and tacit collusion," Working Papers 201902, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
- Escrihuela-Villar Marc, 2016.
"On Merger Profitability and the Intensity of Rivalry,"
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 16(2), pages 1203-1212, April.
- Escrihuela-Villar, Marc, 2015. "On merger profitability and the intensity of rivalry," Economics Discussion Papers 2015-54, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
- Filomena Garcia & Jose Manuel Paz y Miño & Gustavo Torrens, 2020. "The merger paradox, collusion, and competition policy," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(6), pages 2051-2081, December.
- Stephen Davies & Peter Ormosi & Martin Graffenberger, 2015. "Mergers after cartels: How markets react to cartel breakdown," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(3).
- Helder Vasconcelos, 2010.
"Efficiency Gains And Structural Remedies In Merger Control,"
Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(4), pages 742-766, December.
- Vasconcelos, Helder, 2007. "Efficiency Gains and Structural Remedies in Merger Control," CEPR Discussion Papers 6093, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Joseph E. Harrington, Jr, 2005. "Detecting Cartels," Economics Working Paper Archive 526, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
- Stephen Davies & Peter L. Ormosi & Martin Graffenberger, 2014. "Mergers after cartels: How markets react to cartel breakdown," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2014-01, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
- Jovanovic, Dragan & Wey, Christian, 2012. "An equilibrium analysis of efficiency gains from mergers," DICE Discussion Papers 64, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
- Garcia-Gallego, Aurora & Georgantzis, Nikolaos & Gil-Molto, Maria Jose & Orts, Vicente, 2006. "Game-theoretic aspects of international mergers: Theory and case studies," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 395-409, September.
- Tomaso Duso & Klaus Gugler & Florian Szücs, 2013.
"An Empirical Assessment of the 2004 EU Merger Policy Reform,"
Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 123(11), pages 596-619, November.
- Tomaso Duso & Klaus Gugler & Florian Szücs, 2010. "An Empirical Assessment of the 2004 EU Merger Policy Reform," CIG Working Papers SP II 2010-16, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
- Tomaso Duso & Klaus Gugler & Florian Szücs, 2010. "An Empirical Assessment of the 2004 EU Merger Policy Reform," CIG Working Papers SP II 2010-16, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
- Duso, Tomaso & Guglery, Klaus & Szücs, Florian, 2010. "An Empirical Assessment of the 2004 EU Merger Policy Reform," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 337, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Duso, Tomaso & Gugler, Klaus & Szücs, Florian, 2012. "An empirical assessment of the 2004 EU merger policy reform," DICE Discussion Papers 58, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
- António Brandão & Joana Pinho & Hélder Vasconcelos, 2014.
"Asymmetric Collusion with Growing Demand,"
Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 429-472, December.
- António Brandão & Joana Pinho & Hélder Vasconcelos, 2013. "Asymmetric collusion with growing demand," FEP Working Papers 510, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.
- Boone, Jan, 2004.
"Balance of Power,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
4733, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Boone, J., 2004. "Balance of Power," Discussion Paper 2004-104, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Boone, J., 2004. "Balance of power," Discussion Paper 2004-021, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
- Nie, Pu-yan & Wang, Chan & Wen, Hong-xing, 2021. "Horizontal mergers under uniform resource constraints," Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
- Davies, Stephen & Olczak, Matthew & Coles, Heather, 2011. "Tacit collusion, firm asymmetries and numbers: Evidence from EC merger cases," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 221-231, March.
- Nilssen, Tore & Sorgard, Lars, 1998.
"Sequential horizontal mergers,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(9), pages 1683-1702, November.
- Nilssen, T. & Sogard, L., 1995. "Sequential Horizontal Mergers," Papers 04-95, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-.
- Nilssen, T. & Sorgard, L., 1995. "Sequential Horizontal Mergers," Memorandum 1995_030, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
More about this item
JEL classification:
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-COM-2014-12-03 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2014-12-03 (Industrial Organization)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00977619. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.