Analyse des stratégies de contrôle dans une pêcherie gérée par l'effort de pêche : le cas de la pêcherie de coquilles Saint-Jacques de la baie de Saint-Brieuc

Since a report by the European Court of Auditor in December 2007, EU officials have been suggesting that the failure of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) results from too much non compliance and a weak and inefficient enforcement system. As a result, a stakeholder consultation was organised EU-wide, and a new control regulation has been presented by the European Commission in autumn 2008. The objective of the paper is to discuss the reality and the scope of this assertion in the situation of a French coastal fishery managed through effort control (the Saint-Brieuc scallop fishery). Key outlines of the French control strategy are presented for the first time, based on an extensive work with the key stakeholders (national and regional administrations and fishermen representatives). It shows that the system is rather complex, involving several administrations and various types of rules to be enforced. A preliminary assessment of the control strategy in place in Saint-Brieuc shows that despite rather high control costs, the level of non-compliance remains elevated. Such an unsatisfactory outcome, which can be explained by the low deterrence level observed, questions the efficacy of this kind of control strategies.